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Abstract
This thesis is composed of three chapters, distinct in focus but unified by the basic
question of how communication affects strategic behavior. The first chapter deals with
forward induction, a common equilibrium selection principle in game theory which
relies on a sort of implicit communication. The second studies communication in a
face-to-face environment. The third chapter explores the effects of minimal, explicit
communication in a repeated game with frequent actions and imperfect monitoring.
Several general conclusions can be drawn from the work presented below. The first
is that the sort of implicit, rational communication that economic theory describes
does not seem to be widespread. Only about 30% of the subjects who participated in
the experiments described in Chapter 1 demonstrated strong evidence of understand-
ing the forward induction principle. The second is that face-to-face communication
can have adverse effects on an individual’s earnings that are not predicted by eco-
nomic theory. Thus, it is shown in Chapter 2 that agreeable workers are paid less
by their managers in a controlled bargaining environment. The third is that mini-
mal, explicit communication which in theory has no bearing on behavior improves
the earnings of individuals a repeated interaction with imperfect monitoring. On the
other hand, information management institutions that in theory can allow players to
sustain more cooperation can in practice have adverse effects.
The subject of Chapter 1 is implicit communication in a strategic environment.
Imagine that two players, Person 1 and Person 2, are engaged in a strategic interaction
with two stages, and that Person 1 made a move in the first stage. Forward induction
is the notion that from this first stage move Person 2 can infer what Person 1 believes
will happen later. Theoretical models of forward induction take a prominent place
in the literature (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2002; Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986), but
whether or not people make forward induction-like inferences in the laboratory is
an open question. In the experiments described in Chapter 1, detailed reports from
participants playing a battle of the sexes game with an outside option. Approximately
a third of these reports exhibited an excellent understanding of forward induction,
and these reports were associated more strongly with forward induction-like behavior
than reports consistent with first mover advantage and other reasoning processes.
The experiments also provide some evidence that forward induction thinking can be
learned through observation of other players’ actions.
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In most laboratory experiments, subjects interact anonymously through a com-
puterized interface. Communication in the field, however, often takes place in envi-
ronments where agents interact face-to-face. In Chapter 2, I report the results of a
study that allowed this kind of interaction to test the hypothesis that an individual’s
economic choices and outcomes are significantly affected by the personality of others,
measured in terms of the “Big Five” (Costa and McCrae, 1992). Specficially, the
study introduced a bargaining experiment where output was produced by a worker,
a manager determined how this output was divided between the worker and herself,
and the two parties interacted face-to-face to determine their bargaining positions.
The results of this study attribute a significant effect of the worker’s personality on
her bargaining power.
Chapter 3 studies the effects of canonical information management institutions
on cooperation in a game with imperfect monitoring. Delay of information is the first
institutional manipulation this study considers; the second is the ability of players
to communicate their strategies, and the third is bounded rationality in the form
of constrains on reaction time. The results of this study show that subjects earn
significantly more without delay of information, a result that cannot be explained by
standard repeated games models, that communication always improves welfare, and
that average payoffs in one of our treatments (with communication and no delay)
are significantly greater than the upper bound on public Nash equilibrium payoffs.
Exploring the possibility that this is driven by bounded rationality in the form of
reaction lags, the study finds that slowing down the experiment has no significant
effect on behavior.
iv
Contents
Acknowledgements i
Dedication ii
Abstract iii
List of Tables viii
List of Figures ix
1 Forward Induction 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.1 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.1 Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.2 Feedback Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.3 Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.4 Treatments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3 Rating Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4.1 Behavior in the Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4.2 Report Evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.4.3 Relationship Between Thinking and Behavior . . . . . . . . . 21
1.5 Discussion and Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
v
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2 Personality and Bargaining Power 26
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.2 Literature on Income and Personality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.1 Details of the Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4.1 Income, Inequality and Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4.2 Correlations With Personality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.4.3 Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.4.4 Evaluation of Others Through Questionnaires . . . . . . . . . 43
2.4.5 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.4.6 The Worker’s Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3 Cooperative Institutions 49
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2.1 Experimental literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2.2 Theoretical literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.3 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.4 Theoretical predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4.1 Public equilibrium payoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
vi
3.4.2 How information delay can help . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.4.3 Delay with practical cut-offs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.4.4 How bounded rationality can help . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5.1 Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.5.2 Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.5.3 Periodicity of behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
References 79
4 Appendix 90
4.1 Questions for Second Movers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.2 Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.3 Quiz questions for participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.4 Summary of the Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.5 Additional Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.6 Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.7 Personality Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.8 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.9 Instructions to treatment NC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
vii
List of Tables
1 Table 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2 Table 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3 Table 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4 Table 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5 Table 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6 Table 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7 Table 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
8 Table 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
9 Table 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
10 Table 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
11 Table 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
12 Table 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
13 Table 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
14 Table 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
15 Table 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
16 Table 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
17 Table 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
18 Table 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
19 Table 19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
20 Table 20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
viii
List of Figures
1 Figure 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2 Figure 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3 Figure 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4 Figure 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5 Figure 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6 Figure 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
7 Figure 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
8 Figure 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
9 Figure 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
10 Figure 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
11 Figure 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
12 Figure 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
13 Figure 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
ix
1 Forward Induction1
1.1 Introduction
Forward induction (FI) is the notion that what an individual does in an early stage
of a multi-stage interaction contains information about what he or she will do later.
This information can be used strategically by others to facilitate coordination. FI
was introduced to economics by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) and found several suc-
cessful applications, particularly in models of industrial organization (Ponssard, 1991;
Ben-Porath and Dekel, 1992; Bagwell and Ramey, 1996). In the Bagwell and Ramey
(1996) model, two firms, an entrant and an incumbent, make sequential investment
capacity decisions in the presense of multiple equilibria, with the entrant moving first.
The incumbent, assuming that the entrant is rational, deduces the entrant’s posten-
try production from the latter’s capacity investment. If the capacity commitment is
such that the entrant is not able to recoup its investment with a market sharing equi-
librium, the incumbent concludes that the entrant will produce at natural monopoly
levels and shuts down.
The experimental evidence of FI has been mixed. The Bagwell and Ramey (1996)
capacity model has been tested in the laboratory (Brandts et al., 2007); other labo-
ratory studies of FI include Cooper et al. (1993), Brandts and Holt (1995) and Huck
and Mu¨ller (2005). All of these studies show that while subjects often coordinate on
equilibria selected by FI, other factors, such as assymetries between the players, play
a substantial role in determining behavior. In a game where forward and backward in-
duction make different predictions, Balkenborg (1994) showed that the FI outcome is
selected less than 20% of the time. Summarizing the state of the literature, Samuelson
(2005) reported that “the experimental evidence has not been particularly supportive
of forward induction, suggesting that theories based on forward induction could well
be reconsidered.” This suggestion notwithstanding, developments in the theoretical
literature on FI have anything but slowed: Govindan and Wilson (2009), Battigalli
and Friedenberg (2012), Mu¨ller (2012), and Man (2012) are some recent examples.
It seems that the jury on FI is still out.
We contribute to the experimental literature on FI by incorporating a new source
of data: subjects’ elicited beliefs, as expressed in reports of a relatively free-form
1Joint work with Aldo Rustichini.
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Figure 1: The game used in the experiment.
nature. All previous experimental studies FI have focused on participants’ choices,
leaving unsettled the question of whether FI thinking is actually used. Our experi-
ment is the first to address the issue directly. We designed it around a battle of the
sexes game with an outside option, the simplest game in which FI makes a prediction
(Figure 1). The first mover chooses between an outside option of $7 and playing a
battle of the sexes game, in which the first mover’s favored payoff is $10. Under these
parameters, the first mover’s decision to play in the subgame contains the following
implicit message, quoted from Kohlberg and Mertens (1986): “Look, I had the op-
portunity to get [$7] for sure, and nevertheless I decided to play in this subgame, and
my move is already made. And we both know that you can no longer talk to me,
because we are in the game, and my move is made. So think now well, and make your
decision.” For the second mover to “think well” is to realize that any strategy other
than a sure choice of Top is inconsistent with a rational first mover’s decision to play
in the subgame. The best response of a second mover who “thinks well,” therefore,
is to choose Left whenever he or she given the opportunity to play. Accounting for
the above, a rational first mover chooses In in the first stage of the game, and Top
in the second.
We instructed participants to play this game in anonymous, randomly determined
matches. In several rounds, participants answered a series of questions aimed at as-
sessing one’s understanding of the FI argument. Their answers to these questions
were scored by independent evaluators following an incentivized procedure described
in Xiao and Houser (2005), described in more detail in Section 1.3. The evaluators
found a substantial fraction of reports, namely 30%, to show an excellent understand-
ing of FI, and 33% to show only a possible understanding thereof.2 Reports in the
2These “weaker” reports were consistent with FI as well as, for example, the first mover advantage
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“stronger” category were associated with more FI-like choices in the game. This was
true in rounds when reports were provided, as well as those when they were not. In
the former case, a “stronger” report increased the probability of FI-like behavior by
36%, while a “weaker” one increased this probability by 19%. These effect sizes were
significantly different (P < 0.01). Further, participants who understood FI exhibited
a significantly greater change in behavior—in the direction of putting a higher proba-
bility on ((In, Top), Left)—than that experienced by their peers. Thus, a significant
portion of forward induction-like behavior was driven by forward induction reasoning.
Our results provide some evidence that FI reasoning can be learned. While reports
in late periods of the experiment did not exhibit greater understanding of FI, the more
one’s partners chose to play in the subgame, the more likely the player was to produce
a FI report. We find, however, that observation of other players needs a substantial
period of time for a participant’s thinking about the game to change.
One of our treatments allows us to distinguish between not understanding FI but
lacking confidence that others possess such understanding. Thus, a subject might
say that the second mover will choose Right if the subgame is played, but that they
themselves would choose Left in the role of the second mover, since the first mover’s
decision to forgo the outside option contains an implicit message. We identify a
small proportion of participants—approximately 9%—whose reasoning follows such
a framework. These are participants that understand FI, but do not think that others
are able or willing to do the same.
Finally, we find that participants’ chosen actions were broadly consistent with
previous studies in the literature. If the subgame was played, the FI action was
selected in a large majority of cases, 95% of the time for first and 82% of the time for
second movers. Behavior exhibited substantial learning (P < 0.001), and in rounds
where participants reported on their thinking, FI outcomes were significantly more
likely (P < 0.001). This raises the question of how general our conclusions about
the prevalence of FI thinking are. We stress that although we cannot say how often
such thinking is used in absense of belief elicitation, we can put a lower bound on
how many participants (approximately 30%) have the capacity to understand FI,
and study the implications of such understanding for behavior. This is the primary
purpose of our work. The effect of belief elicitation in our experiment is broadly in
line with existing studies, which are reviewed below.
hypothesis.
3
1.1.1 Literature Review
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) associated FI with stability of equilibria. Van Damme
(1989) suggested that FI should instead correspond to the following requirement,
which is not always associated with stability: “...in generic two-person games in
which player i chooses between an outside option or to play a game G of which a
unique viable equilibrium e∗ yields this player more than the outside option, only the
outcome in which i chooses G and e∗ is played in G is plausible.” Cho and Kreps
(1987) showed stability to be useful for studying signaling games. Other theoretical
papers that follow the Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) approach include De Sinopoli
(2004), Glazer and Weiss (1990), Ponssard (1991), Ben-Porath and Dekel (1992),
Bagwell and Ramey (1996), Gul and Pearce (1996), Hauk and Hurkens (2002) and
Govindan and Wilson (2009).
More recently, Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) associated FI with the epistemic
notion of Strong Belief in Rationality (SBR). Stated informally, “player i strongly
believes that an event E 6= ∅ is true (i.e., adopts E as a ‘working hypothesis’) if
and only if she is certain of E at all histories consistent with E” (Battigalli and
Siniscalchi, 2002, p. 357). To see how SBR drives FI reasoning, consider initial (first
stage) beliefs of players in the game illustrated by Figure 1. If the first mover expects
the second to choose Right in the subgame, then Out is a rational action. Hence,
even a second mover with strong belief in rationality can initially believe that the first
mover thinks that the second will choose Right. If the first mover chooses In, however,
this belief is no longer viable: SBR forces the second mover to now take the view that
their opponent assigns a high enough probability to the action Left that choosing In
is justified. Thus, SBR and observed first stage behavior jointly determine beliefs
that the second mover has in the subgame. Recent papers that treat FI within the
epistemic framework developed by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) include Chung
(2011), Battigalli and Friedenberg (2012), and Mu¨ller (2012).
Cooper et al. (1993) reported the results of the first laboratory experiment on FI,
focusing on behavior in a battle of the sexes game with an outside option. Other ex-
perimental studies of FI include Van Huyck et al. (1993), Balkenborg (1994), Brandts
and Holt (1995), Cachon and Camerer (1996), Muller and Sadanand (2003), Huck
and Mu¨ller (2005), Brandts et al. (2007), Blume and Gneezy (2010), and Shahriar
(2013). Most of these studies suggest that FI has predictive power, but identify al-
ternative behavioral forces that are able to account for observed behaviors. Several
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papers, including Cooper et al. (1993), point to asymmetry between the first and the
second mover as a partial explanation of their results. One basic conceptual hurdle
for choice-based studies is the following. Even if FI is shown to have an effect in
a symmetric game, it’s not clear what fraction of behavior is explained by FI in a
game that’s asymmetric. Additional data are needed in order to tease apart FI from
alternative behavioral explanations. Such is the approach we pursue.
There is a growing experimental literature on belief elicitation, the basic findings
of which are reviewed in Schotter and Trevino (2014). Most papers in this literature
use quadratic scoring rules; we do the same when eliciting point beliefs. Although
there is some evidence that these rules are associated with misreporting (Armantier
and Treich, 2013), there is also evidence that the distortions in reports are small
or non-existent (Sonnemans and Offerman, 2001). Some studies, in contexts other
than FI, have addressed the question of how participants’ reported thinking relates
to behavior. Most of these studies (using quadratic scoring rules) have shown that
beliefs to play a significant role in determining subjects’ actions. This is the conclusion
of Nyarko and Schotter (2002), Danz et al. (2012), and Hyndman et al. (2012), for
instance. One prominent exception is Costa-Gomes and Weizsa¨cker (2008), who
conclude that “stated beliefs reveal deeper strategic thinking than [...] actions. On
average, [subjects] fail to best respond to their own stated beliefs in almost half
of the games.” Unlike Costa-Gomes and Weizsa¨cker (2008), we find that subjects
tend to best respond to their stated beliefs and that strategic sophistication is highly
predictive on behavior.
Other papers have looked at the effect of eliciting incentivized and non-incentivized
beliefs on behavior. While the results are mixed, several studies, such as (Croson,
2000), have found that incentivized belief elicitation has a significant effect on sub-
jects’ choices. Ours also finds this effect to be significant. Schotter and Trevino (2014)
interpret the existing evidence to suggest that to the extent belief elicitation alters
behavior, it makes stable, best response behavior emerge sooner. Our results are in
part consistent with this interpretation: the prevalence of FI-like behavior grows over
time even in absense of belief elicitation, but asking participants questions makes such
behavior more likely. We also, however, observe transient effects of belief elicitation
on choice. This suggests that the learning-based explanation of Schotter and Trevino
(2014) is incomplete.
Since thought processes other than FI can lead to FI-like beliefs, we collect free-
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form written report data in addition to point beliefs of the kind that quadratic scoring
rules elicit. These beliefs were scored following the method described in Xiao and
Houser (2005). Specifically, we hired outside evaluators, instructed them how to
classify the free-form reports, and incentivized performance using a coordination game
in which a rater is paid if his or her classification agreed with that of the majority.
Most of the experimental studies in economics that utilized free-form report data
focused on the effect of communication on behavior (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006;
Schotter and Sopher, 2007; Xiao and Houser, 2005; Houser and Xiao, 2011); no paper
prior to ours used such methods to investigate FI thinking.
1.2 Experimental Design
We now outline the experimental design. Section 1.2.1 provides the details of the pro-
tocol; Section 1.2.2 focuses on our choice of feedback structure; Section 1.2.3 describes
the questions participants answered, and Section 1.2.4 motivates and discusses our
treatments. A description of how the reports were categorized is deferred to Section
1.3.
1.2.1 Protocol
The experiment included four treatments (labeled T1-T4), all run in the Social and
Behavioral Sciences Laboratory at University of Minnesota in the fall semesters of
2011 (T1 and T2) and 2012 (T3 and T4). The treatments were programmed with z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007a) and used University of Minnesota undergraduate students
as participants. Upon signing a consent form, each subject was seated at a computer
terminal and given a paper copy of the instructions, the complete text of which is
included in Appendix 4.9. Subjects first read the instructions, then completed a
multiple choice quiz on the details of the game, displayed on a computer screen.
Completing the quiz correctly on the first try resulted in a small ($1) reward. Then,
forty (in T1 and T2) or eight (in T3 and T4) rounds of the game were played.
Half of the participants in each session played as first movers in even and second
movers in odd rounds; for the other half, the reverse was true, and this information
was known to all subjects. Hence, every session was split into two groups, and,
throughout the experiment, participants that started out as first movers were matched
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with those that started out in the other role. Subjects were not told how many times
they will play the game, or when they will have to report on their thinking, but
they were informed that they will “play the game a number of times,” that their
partner will be randomly selected in every round, and that they will answer questions
about their thinking at some points in the experiment. Some of these answers were
incentivized, as described in Section 1.2.3. Second movers were always informed of
their opponent’s first stage choice, that is, whether their partner had chosen In or
Out, but no other feedback was given. Participants in T1 and T2 were paid on the
basis of the outcome of four rounds, and those in T3 and T4 were paid for the outcome
of two. These rounds were drawn at random at the end of the session in addition to
a $5 show up fee. Participants received their earnings from the games at the end of
the session, and, four to five weeks later, a check in the mail for their reports.3
1.2.2 Feedback Structure
As described above, our participants were provided with limited feedback about the
game: Second movers only knew if the subgame was played, and first movers had no
feedback at all. We consider this a crucial element of the design. Kahneman (2011, p.
203), for example, notes that people “are prone to assess the quality of a decision not
by whether the process was sound but by whether its outcome was good and bad.”
Because we viewed FI as precisely the kind of sound process described by Kahneman,
we needed to ensure that it is not confounded by the observation of the choices
of other players. We expected this feature of our design to have consequences on
behavior. On the one hand, it is argued by Rick and Weber (2010) that “withholding
feedback encourages deeper thinking about the game.” On the other, not knowing
what their opponents choose in the subgame, subjects who don’t understand FI, or
lack confidence in the ability of others to use FI reasoning, are likely to assume the
worst (namely a choice of Left) and opt for the outside option. Thus, one would
expect more outside options being chosen in an experiment with little opportunity
for learning.
3The time interval was necessary to rate the reports.
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1.2.3 Questions
We now describe the questions answered by first movers in rounds when reports were
provided. For reasons described in Section 1.3, the answers to questions posed to
second movers were not scored by the evaluators. These answers did, however, play
a role in determining first movers’ payments, following scoring rules described below.
We include second movers’ questions in Appendix 4.1.
Before the decision to go In or Out was made, each first mover answered F1-F3:
F1. If you go in, what move will the second player make?
Possible answers: Left for sure, 90/10 Left/Right, 80/20 Left/Right, ..., Right
for sure.
F2. Why will the second mover make this move?
F3. If you go in, what will the second mover think you will do?
Possible answers: Top for sure, 90/10 Top/Bottom, 80/20 Top/Bottom, ...,
Bottom for sure.
If Out was chosen in the first stage, the first mover saw a screen that said: “We
are now informing the second mover that you chose Out. Press OK to continue.” If
In was chosen, the first mover had to choose their next move and answer F4.
F4. Why did you make this move?
We provided incentives for multiple choice and typed answers with monetary
rewards. Where participants guessed actions that were eventually realized, we used
the quadratic scoring rule to calculate their payment (denoted by pi below). For
example, if a first mover chose In, they were paid in cents for their answer to F1
according to
piS1 =
100− (ProbF1(Right))2 if the second mover chose Left100− (ProbF1(Left))2 if the second mover chose Right ,
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where ProbF1(Right) is the probability assigned to the second mover choosing
Right by the first mover’s answer to F1. This scoring rule ensures that a risk-neutral
decision maker reports truthfully.
If a player made a guess about what their opponent is thinking, they were fined
with a square of the distance between their and their opponent’s reports. For example,
if the first mover chose In, the payment for F3 was calculated as
piF3 = 100− (S3Top − F3Top)2,
where S3Top if the probability assigned by the second mover to their partner choosing
Top in their answer to S3. This scoring rule ensures that a subject with point beliefs
reports his or her conjecture, while a subject maximizing expected earnings with a
non-trivial belief set reports his or her expectation of the partner’s report.4
To provide appropriate incentives for the written reports, we told participants
that each statement describing a partner’s thoughts or behavior would be evaluated
by us, and classified into a category. The same procedure would be applied to the
partner’s description of his own reasoning process, and only the former subject (the
one describing his partner’s thoughts) would be paid in the event the categories
matched. A statement describing one’s own behavior was not incentivized. The
specific instructions were:
For each question in which you explain what the other player is doing (or
thinking), this player will have a corresponding question in which they
have to explain their own behavior (or thoughts). We will evaluate your
answer by placing it into one of several categories, and do the same for the
answer the other player provides. If the categories match, we will pay you
$1. For example, if your explanation of why the other player will behave
in a particular way matches that player’s explanation of their behavior,
you get $1. If your explanations do not match, we will pay you $0. If one
of you does not provide a short answer, we will pay you $0.
Moreover, the subjects were instructed as follows:
4If f(x) be a subject’s subjective probability distribution over stated beliefs of his partner, the
minimization problem is:
min
p∈[0, 1]
∫
(x− p)2f(x)dx.
It is trivial to check that p =
∫
xf(x)dx satisfies the first and second order conditions.
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We will not pay you additional money for answers to questions about
your own thoughts and behavior, but obtaining your considered opinion
is important for our study, so please be as detailed as possible in your
answers.
1.2.4 Treatments
In treatment T1, subjects answered the questions described in Section 1.2.3 in rounds
5, 6, 11, 12, 17, and 18 of the game. In treatment T2, the questions were answered in
rounds 25, 26, 31, 32, 37, and 38. Thus, each subject in these treatments had three
opportunities each to describe their thinking as first and second mover. In addition
to addressing the basic questions of how prevalent FI thinking is and how relates to
behavior, these two treatments allowed us to see test whether such thinking is learned
on a round-by-round basis. A cross-treatment comparison allowed us to see whether
participants were more likely to demonstrate FI thinking if they were given twenty
rounds of additional experience with the game.
One may fail to understand the logic of FI altogether, or doubt that his or her
opponent thinks about the game in such terms. The two treatments described below
were designed to determine whether confidence in one’s partner played a role in
shaping participants’ reported beliefs. T3 and T4 each consisted of eight rounds of
play, with questions answered in the fifth and sixth rounds. Both treatments differed
from T1 in two respects: session length and payment structure. Thus, subjects were
paid for the outcomes of two games in T3 and T4, whereas in T1 they were paid for
four. Treatment T4 had the additional feature that first movers choosing Out were
asked the following three questions:
F5. What would the second mover choose if instead you had moved in?
Possible answers: Left for sure, 90/10 Left/Right, 80/20 Left/Right, ..., Right
for sure.
F6. Why would the second mover have made this choice?
F7. Put yourself for a moment in the role of your partner. Suppose you were the
second mover, and you saw the first mover move in. What would YOU think
in that case?
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Under the null hypothesis of confidence in one’s opponent not being a factor, the
estimate of the number of FI thinkers obtained from T4 should be identical to that
obtained from T3. Rejection of the null would suggest that the number of FI thinkers
estimated in the other treatments is biased downward.
1.3 Rating Procedure
The reports were rated by outside evaluators.5 The evaluators were recruited in Jan-
uary 2013 with an e-mail to PhD students at the School of Physics at the University
of Minnesota. Students of physics were chosen for two reasons. Firstly, they were un-
acquainted with the researchers, so their reports were unlikely to be biased. Secondly,
the quantitative nature of their discipline increased the likelihood that the raters will
understand the notion of FI sufficiently well to provide reasonable ratings. For their
participation, the raters were paid $15 per hour. In addition, four reports were se-
lected at random at the end of the session, and each rater was paid an additional $10
for each instance of their classification agreeing with that of the majority.6
Due to the subjective nature of the procedure, it was important that the same
raters classified every report in the data set. Moreover, the reports needed to be rated
in a single session. Allowing the raters to go home and return at a different date to
finish the scoring procedure carries a cost of losing control over what the raters say
to each other. Thus, for instance, the raters might have agreed on a scheme that
maximizes payment at the expense of classification accuracy. On the other hand,
389 reports were provided by first movers alone in T1-T4.7 We estimated the rating
procedure to take at least three hours even if reports of second movers are not shown
to the raters. Thus, for the sake of time and simplicity, only reports of first movers
were scored. We take the view that thinking about the game is a unitary process: if
a player understands FI as a first mover, he should understand it as a second mover,
as well. While the latter sort of understanding requires a smaller degree of strategic
5In addition, a portion of the reports was scored by the authors of the paper, as in Charness and
Dufwenberg (2006). Our ratings agree with those of the physics students to a large extent; Section
3.6 discusses this in more detail.
6One rater asked if such a scheme incentivizes reporting what one believes his peers to believed,
rather than one’s personal beliefs. Our answer was that our true interest lied in each rater’s own
beliefs about the reports.
7The maximum possible number of reports is 48 × 3 + 60 × 3 + 52 + 70 = 446 reports, we have
fewer because some subjects failed to provide typed answers to our questions.
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sophistication, our own preliminary investigations suggest that this is not the case:
We find as many subjects showing evidence of FI as first but not second movers as
those demonstrating the opposite pattern. This point is elaborated upon in Section
3.6.
After entering the laboratory and signing a consent form, the raters were in-
structed by a PowerPoint-based presentation.8 The presentation described the game,
the structure of the experiment producing the report data (feedback, order of choices,
questions answered by participants, etc.), and explained the notion of FI. It then gave
examples of real reports provided by first movers that could be grouped in each of
the three suggested categories: those showing evidence of understanding FI (“YES”
reports), those potentially showing such evidence (“MAYBE” reports), and those not
showing it (“NO” reports).
A report consisted of the first mover’s answers to F1, F2, and F4 (the latter
if available), as well as the player’s choice in the game. The raters were told that
a report cannot be judged to show understanding of FI without an explanation of
behavior (i.e., an answer to F2 or F4) present, since a belief that the second mover
will choose Right in the subgame with 100% certainty and, in turn, believe that the
first mover will chose Top can be supported by thought processes other than FI.
Thus, the raters were told to pay attention to the text and only look at the answer
to F1 or the subject’s choice if something in a typed response needs to be clarified.
Importantly, the raters were also told that a player choosing Out can understand FI,
and that their job as raters is to identify such understanding—not its reflection in
behavior.
A YES report was explained to be one that explicitly stated that giving up an
outside option of $7 implies that the first mover is looking to make $10 and/or choose
Top, or strongly hinted at the understanding of this fact. The example given to the
raters contained the following sentence (here, as in other examples, original spelling
and grammar are preserved):
I chose to go in so I have sent the message to the second mover that I
intend to make more than the original $7, I can only do this if I choose
top.
If the described reasoning process was consistent with understanding FI, but could
8The slides are available upon request.
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have been used in a similar game with the outside option replaced by ($3, $3), the
raters were told that the report belongs in the MAYBE category. Two examples of
MAYBE reports were given, one of them replicated below.
F1. If you go in, what move will the second player make?
Answer: 80/20 Left/Right.
F2. Why will the second mover make this move?
Answer: I figure that the second mover will make this move because they will
figure that I will choose top, because that way I make more money, and instead
of not making any money, the second mover will most likely choose left and get
$5.
(In, Top)
F4. Why did you make this move?
Answer: I chose top because that way I will make more money, but I am hoping
that the second player will choose left because they know that i will choose top
only because i can make more money and I hope they think that I am not being
generous by choosing bottom for them to make $10 instead of me.
Finally, the raters were told that a NO report should be one clearly not consistent
with understanding of FI. Two examples of such reports were given, one of them
stating the probability of the second mover choosing Right in the subgame to be
70%, and containing the following passage.
Realistically speaking, I think it’s 50/50 in terms of what the smartest
move is. Once you figure in the human emotion known as hope, prefer-
ences for certain options show up. So the idea behind my 70/30 is that
hope can account for 20 percent change. I’m really just going on hunches.
As for right, most people are right handed. So I put two and two together.
Following the instructions, the raters were told that they will be presented with the
reports. They were also told that after all the reports are rated, the experiment
will have a second, shorter, portion, and that the instructions to this half of the
experiment will be given after everyone is done with the initial set of ratings. The
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reports were then presented through an E-Prime interface. A rater had a maximum
of 40 seconds to rate each report. An untimed break was provided every 20 trials.
During the break, the rater could rest, go to the bathroom, or, if desired, continue
the scoring procedure.
After every rater finished with the first set of reports, a second set of instructions,
describing T4, was presented. The raters were instructed that they will score 38
reports consisting of the answers to F5, F6 and F7, and that they should follow the
criteria established previously. After the second set of reports was rated, four reports
were chosen, and each rater’s classifications were compared to that of the majority.
The raters were then paid for their time and classification choices.
1.4 Results
We now turn to our experimental findings. In Section 1.4.1, we summarize partic-
ipants’ behavior and analyze their choices in the game with panel data methods.
In Section 1.4.2, we estimate how many participants understood FI and study how
likely this kind of thinking is to be learned. Section 1.4.3 addresses the relationship
between reported thinking and observed behavior.
1.4.1 Behavior in the Game
A total of 230 subjects participated in the experiment. Table 13 shows the breakdown
of the overall sample size by treatment, as well as a summary of choice data. The
fraction of first movers choosing In fluctuated from 33% in T3 to 45% in T1, and the
overall average (39%) was substantially smaller than the 80% observed by Cooper
et al. (1993). We take this to be a consequence of the structure of feedback in our
design. This conclusion is supported by the observation, discusssed in Section 1.2.2,
that subjects who do not observe their partner’s choice in the subgame (and hence
lack evidence of second movers choosing Left) are more likely to choose the outside
option than those who do.9 Table 13 also tabulates behaviors of first and second
9Another difference between our and Cooper et al.’s design concerns structure of payment. In
Cooper et al.(1993), participants played for points, and instead of our $7, $10 and $5, they could earn
300, 600 and 200 points, respectively, in each game played; the probability of receiving a payment
was calculated as the number of points earned divided by 1000. We chose dollar amounts for two
reasons. First, Selten et al. (1999) showed that lotteries do a poor job at inducing risk neutrality.
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movers in the case the subgame was played. Overall, the probability of first movers
choosing Top was 95%, while that of second movers choosing Right was 82%. Second
movers in our experiment chose the FI strategy less often than those in Cooper
et al. (1993), presumably because exclusion of feedback boosted their optimism about
attaining the more desired outcome. Comparing behavior in the first eight rounds
across treatments, we found no differences in probabilities of first movers choosing
In (P = 0.553) or Top (P = 0.291).10 Although we found a treatment effect on
the choices of second movers (P < 0.05), this effect lost significance when T2 was
excluded from the analysis (P = 0.202). We conclude that subjects in different
treatments behaved similarly in early periods of the game.
T1 T2 T3 T4 T1-T4 (all)
N 48 60 52 70 230
In as first mover 0.45 0.36 0.33 0.35 0.39
In as first mover 0.39 0.33
Top as first mover in subgame 0.98 0.95 0.85 0.88 0.95
Top as first mover in subgame 0.95 0.88
Left as second mover in subgame 0.86 0.84 0.74 0.65 0.82
Left as second mover in subgame 0.77 0.85
FI behavior 0.43 0.34 0.25 0.26 0.36
FI behavior 0.34 0.28
Table 1: Summary of behavioral data. For T1 and T2, the table shows the overall
likelihood of behavior (topmost values in each panel), as well as the likelihood in the
first eight periods (bottom). Thus, second movers in T1 choose Left 86% of the time
overall, and 77% of the time in early periods of the experiment.
In what follows, we focus on “periods” of play. A period is a pair of two consecutive
rounds (e.g., period 1 consists of rounds 1 and 2). Thus, participants in T1 answered
questions about their thinking in periods 3, 6, and 9; participants in T2 answered
them in periods 13, 16, and 19, and participants in T3 and T4 answered them in
period 3. Notice that every participant played once as a first mover and once as a
second mover in every period.11 A participant is defined to be a FI player in a given
Second, we wanted to keep our instructions as simple as possible.
10Recall that the eighth round was final in T3 and T4.
11We focus on periods in subsequent analysis because, as discussed in Section 1.3, we consider
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Figure 2: The probabilities of displaying FI-like behavior in different treat-
ments. Note the spikes around periods when participants answered questions about
their thinking.
period if, in this period, he chose In and Top as a first mover, and, provided that he
was given an opportunity to play in the subgame, Left as a second mover. FI player
should be read as shorthand for “a player exhibiting behavior consistent with FI.”
We emphasize that being such a player does not imply an understanding of the FI
argument: in Section 1.4.3, we study the relationship between thinking and behavior
directly. The bottom rows of Table 13 summarize the prevalence of FI-like behavior
in T1-T4. Overall, behavior was consistent with being a FI player 36% time, and
no significant treatment effect was found in the first four periods (P = 0.159). In
Figure 2, we plot the probabilities of being a FI player in each period of the game
for participants in T1 (a), T2 (b) and T3 and T4 (c). The figure suggests that this
probability went up in periods participants answered questions about their thinking.
To confirm these observations, we estimated the following logit model:
P (FIPLAY ERit = 1) =
1
1 + exp−1
(
β0 + β1vrit + β2t+
∑5
k=2 β3,kTreatmentik
) ,
(1.1)
thinking about the game to be a unitary process. See also Section 3.6 for evidence that this assump-
tion is reflected in the report data.
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where vrit = 1 if i provided a verbal report in period t and 0 otherwise, and
FIPLAY ERit =

1 if, in period t, i chose (In, Top) as first
and, given the chance, Left as second mover
0 otherwise
.
Here, as in the rest of our analysis, the standard errors were clustered by subject. The
results showed β1 to be positive and highly significant (P < 0.001; results reported
in Table 2). It is perhaps surprising that FI-like behavior became less likely in
each period that followed one with reports.12 We take this to indicate that our
questions encouraged participants to think more carefully about the game and one’s
behavior therein, and that their thinking reverted to a baseline, less focused, level
when questions were not asked. The coefficient on period number was also significant,
suggesting that FI-like behavior is learned over time (P < 0.001).
Dependent variable=FI behavior
Period no. 0.007****
(0.002)
Verbal report in period 0.076****
(0.017)
2.Treatment -0.091
(0.072)
3.Treatment -0.131
(0.076)
5.Treatment -0.119*
(0.062)
Observations 2648
Table 2: Panel analysis of behavioral data. Marginal effects of logit regressions.
Subject-clustered standard errors in parentheses. * P < 0.1, ** P < 0.05, ***
P < 0.01, **** P < 0.001. Participants exhibit learning of FI behavior, which in
addition becomes more likely in periods when verbal reports are provided.
12In Figure 2, this can be seen as “spikes” in FI-like behavior. In the above-described regression,
this can inferred from the fact that learning is controlled for.
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1.4.2 Report Evaluations
Overall, the evaluators judged 30% of reports to show an understanding of FI, placing
33% of reports in the MAYBE and 37% in the NO category. Table 3 shows how
these numbers break down across treatments. Recall that all treatments but T2 had
subjects report on their thinking in the third period (T1, in addition to this, asked for
reports in periods 6 and 9). It is apparent from the table that the fraction of period
3 reports judged to show evidence of FI fluctuated across treatments (from 15% in
T3 to 28% in T1 and T4; see Table 3); however, there was no significant treatment
effect on how reports in this period were categorized (P = 0.255). In T1 and T2,
where participants provided reports in multiple periods of the game, 34% of reports
were judged to show an understanding of FI, and the fraction of participants showing
understanding of FI was even higher. Seven subjects provided no reports at all in
these two treatments, and, of the remaining 101, 47% had at least one YES report.
T1 T3 T4 Period 3 (all treatments)
YES 0.28 0.15 0.28 0.24
MAYBE 0.38 0.31 0.27 0.31
NO 0.35 0.54 0.45 0.45
Period 3 Period 6 Period 9 T1 (all periods)
YES 0.28 0.37 0.37 0.34
MAYBE 0.38 0.32 0.34 0.34
NO 0.35 0.32 0.29 0.32
Period 13 Period 16 Period 19 T2 (all periods)
YES 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.34
MAYBE 0.38 0.31 0.37 0.36
NO 0.28 0.35 0.30 0.31
Table 3: Percentages of reports in different categories, as scored by outside
evaluators.
One explanation of these findings is that a large fraction of participants (≈ 50%)
understood FI but wavered in their confidence of other subjects’ understanding, re-
sulting in a smaller fraction of YES reports in any given period. The treatment T4
was designed to address this hypothesis; in it, first movers choosing Out were asked
to explain how they would have thought about the game as a second mover. Of the 38
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38 total
14 YES
8 Y 2 M 4 N
9 MAYBE
1 Y 5 M 3 N
15 NO
1 Y 2 M 12 N
Figure 3: The 38 auxiliary reports of T4 and the basic reports associated
with them.
reports, 14 were judged to show evidence of FI reasoning (Figure 3). Of these 14, six
were provided by participants judged to provide a MAYBE or NO report while they
were playing the game. Thus, six out of 70 participants in T4, approximately 9%, un-
derstood FI but lacked the confidence to express this understanding while they were
making their first stage decisions. These participants, while few, may explain the
discrepancy between the percentages of players who understood FI in the longer (T1
and T2) and shorter (T3 and T4) treatments: If we only consider reports obtained in
the course of the game, we find that a larger fraction of participants understood FI
in T1 and T2 than in T4 (P < 0.05). However, if we account for reports of players
choosing Out, we find that 36% of participants in T4 show understanding of FI, and
that this proportion is not significantly different from the 47% estimated in T1 and
T2 (P = 0.208).
Treatments T1 and T2 allowed us to explore another possibility—that participants
in the longer treatments were more likely to understand FI because they were provided
with an opportunity to learn it. Table 3, panels b and c, shows how reports were
classified in different periods. An exact Fisher test shows no significant effect of
period number on report categories in T1 (P = 0.897) or T2 (P = 0.933). Recall
that reports were elicited early on (periods 3, 6, and 9) in T1 and later in T2 (period
13, 16 and 19). If experience with the game made FI thinking more likely, we should
observe a significant difference between how reports are categorized in T1 and T2.
However, no such difference is manifest in our data (P = 0.988).13
We thus hypothesized that FI was learned on the basis of observing other players,
13In light of the fact that FI-like behavior became more prevalent over time (Table 2), these
findings may appear puzzling. We discuss the issue of learning further in Section 1.4.3.
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YES report MAYBE report NO report
No. of times partner chose In 0.035*** 0.010 -0.046***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016)
Period no. -0.008 -0.005 0.014
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
2.Treatment -0.032 0.047 -0.015
(0.115) (0.122) (0.111)
3.Treatment -0.175** -0.027 0.202**
(0.083) (0.089) (0.096)
5.Treatment -0.030 -0.077 0.107
(0.084) (0.078) (0.086)
Observations 389 389 389
Table 4: The effect of feedback on the thinking of participants. Marginal
effects on predicted probabilities in a multinomial logit regression. Subject-clustered
standard errors in parentheses. * P < 0.1, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01, ****
P < 0.001.
and not playing the game per se, and estimated a multinomial logit model with
pitj =
exp(β0j + β1jt+ β2jOBSit +
∑5
k=2 β3jkTreatmentik)
1 +
∑
j∈{Y ES,MAY BE} exp(β0j + β1jt+ β2jOBSit +
∑5
k=2 β3jkTreatmentik)
,
where pitj is the probability of subject i producing a report of type j in period t,
and OBSit is the number of times i observed his or her partner choose In in periods
prior to t. The model showed that observing one’s partner choose In made a YES
report more and a NO report less likely (P < 0.01 for both marginal effects; results
shown in Table 4). However, when we estimated the same model in three separate
specifications, one restricting the sample to T1, the other to T2, and the third to
T3 and T4, we found these effects with P -values below 0.001 for T2, but not in the
other treatments (largest P = 0.346).14 Thus, a substantial amount of feedback was
required for a participant’s thinking about the game to change.
14Inclusion of interactions of OBSit with the treatment dummies in the full model produces the
same conclusion.
20
1.4.3 Relationship Between Thinking and Behavior
In rounds when reports were provided, a YES report was associated with FI-like
behavior 69%, a MAYBE report 50%, and a NO report 16% of the time. Moreover,
these proportions are significantly different (P < 0.001 for all pairwise comparisons).
To quantify the effect of providing each kind of report on behavior, we added YES,
MAYBE, and NO report dummies to the model specified by Equation 1.1, restricting
the data to periods in which reports were provided.15 The results, collected in Table
5, column 1, show that a YES report increased the likelihood of being a FI player
by 36%, while a MAYBE report increased it by 19%. Crucially, the effect of a YES
report was significantly greater than that of a MAYBE report (P < 0.01). A better
understanding of FI was associated with more FI behavior.
It was also true that subjects who produced at least one YES report exhibited FI-
like behavior in more periods of the game without reports than subjects who did not
(P < 0.001). This was true even when we restricted our attention to participants who
did not provide any reports in the NO category (P < 0.001). To further investigate
this relationship, we controlled for participants’ reported thinking in Equation 1.1,
restricting the sample to those periods of the game when reports were not provided,
and including a dummy for whether the participant produced at least one report in the
YES category (Understandi). The results showed that participants who understood
FI were 22% more likely to exhibit FI-like behavior in rounds without reports (P <
0.001; Table 5, column 2). When we controlled for the content of reports, including
a variable for the number of reports provided in each category, the coefficient on
Understandi lost significance, but the coefficient on the number of YES reports was
significant and positive, suggesting that each additional report in the YES category
made FI-like behavior 11% more likely (P < 0.05), while a NO report decreased its
likelihood by 12% (P < 0.01; Table 5, column 3). We take these results to mean that
how well a participant understands FI is a better predictor of behavior than whether
or not he or she understands it at all.
Our final comments in this section deal with learning. Recall that while FI-like
behavior became more likely with time (Table 2), the occurrence of YES reports
did not (Table 3, panels b and c). To reconcile these results, we interacted t and
vrit with the Understandi dummy in the specification described by Equation 1.1,
15Since some subjects failed to provide reports, the report dummies are not collinear. The no
report case serves as a baseline.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Periods with reports Periods without reports All periods All periods
Dependent variable=FI behavior
Period no. 0.006 0.007**** 0.007****
(0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
2.Treatment -0.066 -0.081 -0.102* -0.080
(0.096) (0.063) (0.059) (0.064)
3.Treatment 0.023 -0.078 -0.094 -0.098
(0.092) (0.080) (0.095) (0.069)
5.Treatment -0.110 -0.070 -0.066 -0.097
(0.079) (0.066) (0.090) (0.062)
YES report 0.359****
(0.076)
MAYBE report 0.190**
(0.079)
NO report -0.124
(0.086)
Understanding of FI 0.221**** -0.093
(0.048) (0.092)
No. of YES reports 0.112**
(0.053)
No. of MAYBE reports 0.019
(0.041)
No. of NO reports -0.120***
(0.045)
Period no. if FI understood 0.017****
(0.003)
Period no. if FI not understood -0.001
(0.003)
Effect of answering ques. if FI understood 0.144****
(0.032)
Effect of answering ques. if FI not understood 0.030
(0.026)
Observations 446 2202 2202 2648
Table 5: Participants’ thinking accounted for in panel analysis of behavior.
Marginal effects of logit regressions. Subject-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
* P < 0.1, ** P < 0.05, *** P < 0.01, **** P < 0.001. The first two columns only
use periods of the game without reports. Understanding of the FI argument makes
FI-like behavior more likely (columns 1-3). Participants who understand FI are more
likely to exhibit learning than their peers (column 4).
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allowing learning and the response to vrit to depend on whether FI was understood
by the participant. The results ( Table 5, column 4) showed that only participants
with an understanding of FI exhibited significant learning (P < 0.001 for subjects
who understood FI vs. P = 0.7 for those who didn’t) and changed their behaviors in
rounds with questions (P < 0.001 vs. P = 0.241). We interpret our findings to mean
that while FI thinking is unlikely to be learned in the course of an experimental
session, participants who have a preliminary understanding of the FI logic can be
encouraged with time and by being asked to consider the game more carefully.
1.5 Discussion and Robustness
Because the game was played repeatedly with multiple partners, it is possible that
participants learned FI thinking from players they were matched with. As mentioned
above, however, feedback had no measurable effect on participants’ thinking in three
out of four of our treatments (i.e., for 170 out of 230 participants). We take this
fact to indicate that subjects were unlikely to have learned FI from others, justifying
the use of subject-clustered standard errors in our regression analysis. Our results,
however, were robust to other model specifications. Thus, using random or fixed
effects models, clustering the standard errors by session, or including session fixed
effects produced the same basic findings.
Some comments on our belief elicitation procedure are in order. First, when
one player is making a guess about another’s thoughts, only the former individual
gets paid in the case of a match. The other player’s report, in this case, is either not
incentivized (if own behavior is explained), or incentivized by paying this player more
if his guess of the partner’s behavior is closer to the truth. Our design therefore does
not induce a coordination game with multiple equilibria in statements, where a player
has an incentive to state a less sophisticated explanation than his or her true belief
if he thinks his matched player might think in a simpler way. The player would only
want to do this if he or she is altruistic. Secondly, as noted by Blanco et al. (2010), an
experiment that elicits participants’ beliefs about their partners’ behaviors is subject
to a potential hedging problem. In our design, a subject was paid for guessing his
partner’s behavior only in the case the subgame is played. In this situation, we find
that first movers play a risk-neutral best response to their beliefs 82% and second
movers 83% of the time. We conclude that most of the reports show no evidence of
hedging.
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Evaluators were asked to judge the quality of a strategic thinking, so the quality
of their performance is essential. To test it, we compared it with our own evaluations
of reports in the longer treatments. We found a high degree of correlation between
our ratings of first movers’ reports and those provided by the evaluators (r = 0.86,
P < 0.001). While this high correlation is not surprising, given that we instructed
the evaluators how to rate the reports, it serves as a good test of the evaluators’
performance. Note that there is little reason to be concerned about experimenter
demand effects. First, we take our definitions and examples of what constitutes
forward induction thinking to be uncontroversial. Second, the evaluators were given
no reason to believe that we, the experimenters, were interested in finding that many
participants exhibit forward induction reasoning, or that few participants do. Indeed,
what we told the evaluators is that we are interested in their true beliefs (see footnote
five).
As mentioned in Section 1.3, understanding of FI requires a higher degree of
strategic sophistication by the first mover than by the second. Our own categoriza-
tions, which considered reports of players in both roles, allowed us to address how
reports of first and second movers relate. We find that 61 subjects in T1 and T2
failed to provided a YES report. Of the remaining subjects, 22 provided YES reports
in both roles; 12 provided it as second but not first movers, and 13 provided it only
in the role of first movers. We also observe that in a given period a first mover’s
report is more likely to display evidence of FI than that of a player in the opposite
role (23% vs. 37% of reports; distributions of ratings are different with P < 0.05).
Thus, while the intuition that it is easier to display evidence of FI as a second mover
is confirmed, if subjects are given multiple opportunities to report on their thinking,
they are equally able to show evidence of FI in either role.
1.6 Conclusion
We find strong evidence that FI logic guides thinking and behavior of a substantial
number of experimental participants. The display of this ability is in part influenced
by the activity of analyzing and explaining one’s thought process, and in part by
the observation, although limited, of the actions of others: the more often a sub-
ject observes their partners choose In, the more likely he is to exhibit FI thinking.
There is also a link between understanding FI and behaving according to its logic:
subjects that show evidence of SBR in their reports are more likely to exhibit FI
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behavior. Thus, FI, and not other factors, such as first mover advantage, induces
largest frequencies of behavior predicted by the theory.
Previous experimental research had provided only mixed evidence in support of
the FI hypothesis. Our results, based on a different method which provides richer
information suggest instead that FI thinking models accurately the reasoning process
of a significant amount of participants. This confirms existing findings on the specif-
ically human ability to make predictions by pure reasoning (Teglas et al., 2011). In
the game we used, the second mover observes information on their opponent’s first
stage behavior, and, guided by an abstract assumption on players’ behavior (SBR),
makes a prediction about a novel situation (the second stage of the game). It is likely
that previous experimental studies of FI did not provide supportive evidence because
FI is not easily identified by behavior in a single game: using only behavioral data, it
is impossible to quantify how much the effect of the focal point contributes to ((In,
Top), Left) being played. Our methods circumvent this problem by treating FI as
a cognitive process and looking for it in participants’ explanations of their thoughts
and behavior, rather than their selected actions.
Finally, a fraction of one third of players is substantial but is a minority. Our
subjects, however, were inexperienced, and were incentivized with amounts typical
of laboratory economics experiments. Experienced or professional players, in real
life environments, are likely to understand and use the forward induction logic more
frequently. This hypothesis should be tested in future research.
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2 Personality and Bargaining Power16
2.1 Introduction
In a perfectly competitive economy, imputations of value to factors of production are
completely determined (Clark, 1902). Without perfect competition, however, market
forces alone fail to determine these imputations (Edgeworth, 1881). In the context
of organizations, Knight (1921, II.IV.4) reconciles this indeterminacy as follows:
“There are many productive organizations consisting of small numbers
of rather unique agents which very effectively supplement each other and
are not so effectively demanded elsewhere. In such a case competition does
not afford means of distributing the entire yield of the group among its
members; an appreciable part of it resists automatic division and remains
a joint product, dependent on the peculiar effectiveness of the particular
organization. Many partnerships illustrate this point. Imputation goes
as far as the group, giving that its proper income, but fails to distribute
accurately within it. In case of a partnership this division between the
members is usually made on ethical grounds or on the basis of ‘bargaining
power,’ sheer personal force. In industry at large the special product of
the organization above that competitively assigned to its components is
likely to go, largely at least, to the entrepreneur, though bargaining power
or the strategic situation always plays a large part in the proceedings.”
Knight’s argument involves two steps. First, in many organizations, market forces
fail to determine its members’ individual imputations. Secondly, this indeterminacy
is often resolved by personal force. The first step epitomizes an extensive literature on
team production, from Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Holmstrom (1982) to Pren-
dergast (1999), Levin (2003) and beyond. In this paper, we take as given this first step
and focus on the second step of Knight’s argument. We offer a formal, quantifiable
interpretation of personal force in terms of psychological factors—specifically, indi-
vidual personality traits—and experimentally test Knight’s hypothesis. Our results
show that personal force plays a significant role in the imputation of value.
Individual personality traits can be thought of as enduring behavioral patterns
and responses to environmental cues (Almlund et al., 2011). The classic “Big Five”
16Joint work with David Rahman.
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framework (Costa and McCrae, 1992), based on respondents’ answers to question-
naires, measures personality along several dimensions: openness to new experience,
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism. This measurement
framework is widely accepted by psychologists for many reasons, amongst them ro-
bustness (Goldberg, 1993), its strong relationship with relevant configurations in
the brain (DeYoung et al., 2010), and its ability to predict individual outcomes and
choices. Thus, personality is related to long-term individual characteristics such as
income, education, health and relationship status (Borghans et al., 2008, and refer-
ences therein). Recently, interdependencies between personality traits and economic
preferences have also been documented (Anderson et al., 2011; Becker et al., 2012).
Overall, there is general consensus in the literature that individuals’ economic choices
and outcomes are significantly affected by their own personality.
We, on the other hand, designed an experiment to test a different hypothesis—that
individuals’ economic choices and outcomes are significantly influenced by personality
traits of others. The experiment proceeded roughly as follows.17 First, each subject
completed a Big Five personality questionnaire. The participants were then randomly
matched into hierarchical two-person teams, consisting of a worker and a manager,
whose members interacted over several periods. Workers performed the same repet-
itive task every period, which we used to measure and control for productivity, and
which translated stochastically into monetary earnings that accrued to the manager.
The worker’s remuneration was solely the manager’s decision, and it came at the
manager’s own expense. At the end of each interaction, team members completed
a personality questionnaire on behalf of their partners, which gave us a measure of
perceived personality traits. Subjects were then randomly re-matched.
Our experimental design differs from most in the bargaining literature in three
respects. One is that we allowed subjects to regularly interact face-to-face and engage
in free-form communication, giving them the opportunity to gradually absorb each
others’ personality traits. Second, we introduced a reasonable amount of uncertainty
in the experiment. This obscured behavioral prescriptions based on ethical grounds
and opened the door for greater variation, including personality-driven variation,
in behavioral patterns. Third, subjects’ reported perceptions of each other’s traits
provided instruments for identifying a causal effect of personality.
17See Section 3.3 for further discussion and justification of our design decisions.
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Although managers on average allocated 50% of output to workers, our experiment
was successful in producing substantial variation in inequality (Table 6). Moreover,
this variation could not be explained by variation in output (Table 7). There was,
however, significant correlation between the worker’s experienced inequality and her
personality traits, which persisted even when physical characteristics were controlled
for (Table 8). To assess the causal effect of the worker’s personality, we focused on
agreeableness, using the worker’s evaluation of her other manager as an instrument.
We found the effect of agreeableness to be statistically and economically significant
(Table 20): An increase in a worker’s agreeableness by one standard deviation led
the manager to increase the worker’s income by about 16%. Recognizing that teams
interacted over several rounds, we also studied the dynamic effects of personality.
Early in the interaction, agreeableness had no significant effect on earnings, but its
effect increased progressively over time to achieve overall significance (Figure 4).
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that subjects gradually learned each
others’ personality traits as the experiment proceeded. A priori, it seems plausible
that managers might pay agreeable workers less because they would tend to be more
accepting of harsher terms. On the other hand, managers may also be inclined to
reward workers with a higher opinion of them (as in the psychological games of
Geanakoplos et al., 1989). We found that agreeable workers had significantly less
favorable opinions of their managers, which suggests that the main channel through
which agreeableness translates into lower earnings is the former one: Managers found
agreeable workers more docile and decided to pay them less (Table 10).
Our results are important for understanding the psychological sources of bar-
gaining power and, more generally, influence. First, bargaining is a basic facet of
economic activity, yet the sources of comparative bargaining advantage do not seem
to be well articulated in economic theory. Cooperative solutions, such as Nash bar-
gaining (Nash Jr, 1950) and related variants, take it as given, and noncooperative
solutions have so far been unable to usefully incorporate psychological factors. Ru-
binstein (1982) offers impatience and institutional details (temporal monopoly) to
explain bargaining power,18 yet neither of these issues is practically relevant in our
experiment or many real-world situations. Similarly, the model of Abreu and Gul
(2000), based on reputation, provides a language with which to express differences
in bargaining outcomes, but no guidance whatsoever for the determinants of such
reputation.
18A related extension due to Binmore et al. (1986) adds risk aversion as a possible explanation,
provided certain institutional assumptions are met (e.g., a random deadline).
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Secondly, even if there was an accepted theoretical relationship between psycho-
logical traits and bargaining power, it could only deliver qualitative predictions. In
order to measure this effect quantitatively, it is necessary to explore the issue em-
pirically. The econometric studies of Seibert and Kraimer (2001), Heckman et al.
(2006) and others have the drawback that they study long-run incomes without be-
ing able to distinguish between influence or bargaining power and productivity in
any specific situation, let alone disentangle the relative values of interpersonal traits
and performance. This problem motivates an experimental approach to improve our
understanding of just how people’s psychology contributes to their income.
Although there is a vast experimental literature on bargaining, as well as some
relating bargaining and personality, it is unable to address our main hypothesis.
Most of this literature attempts to explain an individuals’ propensity to share as a
function only of their own personality (Brandsta¨tter and Ko¨nigstein, 2001; Ben-Ner
and Kramer, 2011; Anderson et al., 2011). In fact, in these experiments there was no
possibility for subjects to learn the personality of counter parties, as interactions were
either hypothetical or anonymous. We, however, are interested in measuring the effect
of one party’s personality on another’s decision. To accommodate this possibility, our
design allowed subjects to learn each others’ personality traits by giving them the
opportunity to regularly interact face-to-face and communicate freely.19
An exception to this literature is the work of Morris et al. (1999), who analyzed
an experiment where MBA students bargained face-to-face over mock salaries. There
are important differences between their work and ours in terms of both method and
focus—we discuss them at length in Section 2.2 below. In summary, they framed
their experiment in a way that reduced the relevance of actual personality, and they
focused on understanding how bargaining outcomes and behavior biased perception
of personality, rather than the effect of personality on bargaining outcomes.
2.2 Literature on Income and Personality
This paper is motivated partly by a well-documented relationship between income
and personality. Heckman et al. (2006) estimate a wage equation that significantly
19Free-form face-to-face interaction is standard practice in psychology and organizational behavior
(Thompson et al., 2010, and references therein). Face-to-face communication is less common in
economics, but accepted (e.g., Mobius and Rosenblat, 2006). See Section 3.3 for further discussion.
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relates earnings with cognitive skills (such as IQ) and noncognitive skills (such as
personality), suggesting that (p. 1) “[. . . ] personality traits, persistence, motivation
and charm matter for success in life.” A number of studies looking at effects of
individual personality traits identified a negative relationship between agreeableness
and income for both men and women (Mueller and Plug, 2006; Nyhus and Pons,
2005; Ng et al., 2005; Rode et al., 2008). However, these analyses leave out important
details about how a worker’s personality affects his or her income, as well as the role
of others in wage determination. In other words, they fall short of being able to
explain just how “charm” (for instance) matters for success in life. Thus, it cannot
be inferred from Heckman et al.’s wage equation whether personality increases wages
because it motivates individuals towards more productive behavior or more rent-
seeking behavior, such as bargaining skills, which may be unproductive, as Knight
(1921) suggests. One goal of our study is to disentangle quantitatively these different
motivations in a richer model of wage determination, thus beginning to open the
“black box” behind the relationship between personality and earnings.
Personality also has a well-documented effect on economic preferences (e.g., Borghans
et al., 2008; Becker et al., 2012). More relevant to our paper’s main results is perhaps
the observation that agreeable people are more altruistic in dictator (Ben-Ner et al.,
2008) and trust (Anderson et al., 2011) games. We should emphasize, though, that our
experiment differs from others in the personality and bargaining literature by virtue
of focusing on the link between one’s decisions and personality traits of other people.
Hence, our paper is closer in spirit to the work of Ben-Ner and Kramer (2011), who
studied the effect of kinship on the amount received in a dictator game, and Judge
et al. (2012), who found that one’s personality—particularly agreeableness—affected
another’s estimate of job growth potential. Both of these studies, however, used
hypothetical descriptions of people as explanatory variables. For our purposes, real,
direct interaction was important to allow personality traits to both express themselves
endogenously and translate into bargaining power, rather than be communicated ex-
ogenously. Incentives were hypothetical in these studies, too. This is important,
as according to Camerer and Hogarth (1999), excluding financial incentives may in-
crease certain behavioral traits associated with personality, such as generosity and
risk-seeking. This motivates our use of monetary transactions to clarify the relation
between surplus division and personality.
Arguably, the study closest to ours in method is Morris et al. (1999), which also
used face-to-face interaction in a bargaining environment. This study, however, fo-
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cused on how bargaining outcomes and behavior biased perceptions of personality. In
particular, the authors did not measure how personality traits of other people affect
bargaining decisions. They also argued that the behavior of participants in their ex-
periment was mostly driven by “situational” rather than personality factors.20 This
is, perhaps, not surprising, in light of Morris et al.’s experimental design. As the
authors state in their paper (p. 56), “[p]articipants were familiar from negotiation
class with the concepts of the value and risk of an alternative option and had been
taught guidelines for estimating these from an opponent’s negotiation behavior.” As
Thompson (1990) and Monson et al.(1982) argue, personality is more likely to matter
when strong behavioral prescriptions, such as those taught to the MBA students in
Morris et al.’s study, are absent. We designed our experiment with this in mind.
2.3 Experimental Design
Our motivation for the experiment was to create an environment that resembled the
spirit of Knight’s argument and allowed us to test his hypothesis. We matched sub-
jects into teams of two, motivated by the observation that individuals often interact
in small groups (Burke, 2003). By design, the teams did not interact with one an-
other, so there was no competition for team members. This feature of the experiment
kept it aligned with Knight’s (1921, II.IV.4) observation that “[t]here are many pro-
ductive organizations consisting of small numbers of rather unique agents which very
effectively supplement each other and are not so effectively demanded elsewhere.” As
a result, the division of surplus amongst team members became indeterminate and
open to bargaining, and, hence, possibly personal force.
We framed the experiment around a hierarchical organization whose members
performed different tasks,21 to avoid a situation that might easily lead subjects to
agree on equal surplus division. This issue is well-documented in experiments, espe-
20Specifically (p. 53), “[. . . ] important components of bargaining behavior [. . . ] are greatly
determined by the economic incentives and constraints a player faces and little determined by
personality traits (Thompson, 1990).” However, Thompson (1990) is much more cautious, admitting
that (p. 520) “[. . . ] this conclusion is incomplete and overly simplistic.” Amongst several reasons for
this view, she reports that (pp. 520-521) “Monson et al. (1982) suggested that personality is more
predictive of behavior in ambiguous situations than in settings in which there are strong prescriptions
for behavior.”
21Notice, however, that—as seen from the experiment’s instructions (Appendix 4.9)—no explicit
hierarchical descriptions of player roles, such as “worker” or “manager,” were imposed on subjects.
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cially ones without anonymity. Thus, Bohnet and Frey (1999) show that removing
anonymity in dictator games eliminates most variation in offers around equal divi-
sion. On the other hand, we viewed face-to-face interaction as an important aspect
of our experimental design, since it allowed subjects to learn each other’s personality
traits. By itself, this element of our design might substantially reduce the variation
in offers. For our purposes, however, variation was important to be able to trace the
relationship between personality and offers, since without variation there could be
none due to personality. Therefore, to compensate for the loss of variation in offers
due to lack of anonymity, we subjected team members’ interaction to a reasonable
amount of ambiguity and complexity, on the grounds that more ambiguity would give
subjects moral “wiggle room” for their decisions. This intuition was substantiated
experimentally by Dana et al. (2007), who showed that (see their abstract) “[. . . ]
fairness decreases substantially when the connection between choices and outcomes
is obfuscated.”
Some economists have expressed concern regarding face-to-face interaction in ex-
periments. One reason may be that (Crawford, 1998, p. 293) “[n]onpecuniary influ-
ences on preferences are usually suppressed by avoiding face-to-face or nonanonymous
interactions [. . . ].” However, these are precisely the influences we are trying to cap-
ture. A particularly appealing reason for choosing face-to-face interaction rather
than chat messages, phone-based or other types of controlled communication is per-
haps best articulated by Nadler and Shestowsky (2006, p. 165): “[. . . ] when the
structure of the negotiation is a complex, potentially integrative negotiation that re-
quires reciprocal information sharing, the inability to see or hear the other person
in conjunction with lack of co-temporality can exacerbate initial distrust, leading
to reluctance to engage in the kind of reciprocal exchange of information required
to reach a high-quality agreement, or any agreement at all, for that matter.” Our
environment, described below, is complex enough that this was a potential concern.
Each experimental session was divided into two halves. Subjects were randomly
rematched from one half to the next, with subject roles unchanged, so workers re-
mained workers. Perceived personality traits were recorded at the end of each half.
Designing our experiment to have these two halves was particularly useful for two
reasons. First, it gave us some variation in outcomes for each subject, improving the
statistical properties of our sample. Second, it delivered a useful instrument to iden-
tify a causal relationship between earnings and endogenous variables. In principle,
a worker’s personality may be correlated with other factors unobservable to us that
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contributed to the manager’s determination of the worker’s income. We found that a
worker’s personality was correlated with her perception of her manager. Since each
worker was matched with two different managers, to identify the effect of a worker’s
personality on a manager’s remuneration decision, we used the worker’s perception
of the other manager’s personality as an instrument. See Section 2.4.3 for details.
2.3.1 Details of the Experimental Design
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007a) in the Anderson Hall Social and Behavioral Sciences Laboratory
at the University of Minnesota. After completing the Big Five personality question-
naire of DeYoung et al. (2007), subjects familiarized themselves with instructions
provided.22 They were then randomly matched into teams of two, and each team
member was randomly allocated the role of worker or manager. Worker and manager
sat next to one another in separate carrels and interacted for 15 rounds. Everyone
was told that they were sitting next to their teammate after being matched.23
In each round, the worker’s job was to complete a repetitive task, borrowed from
Gill and Prowse (2012): to move as many sliders as possible, from a total of 24, within
an allotted time of 40 seconds. A monetary prize of $4 was contained behind one and
only one of the sliders. Moving a slider meant physically dragging it to position 50
(out of 100) with a mouse. For every slider not moved to position 50, a penny was
added to worker’s “penny” account, which was kept separate from the account the
manager used to pay the worker.24 There was therefore a real as well as a monetary
cost of effort. We hoped that emphasizing the monetary cost would make it clearer to
the managers that workers need to be incentivized. The worker was never informed
of whether or not she discovered a prize.
The manager started out with $5, and had to pay 40 cents in every period, in
order to continue the experiment. If and only if the worker discovered a prize, $4 were
added to the manager’s personal account. There was therefore a possibility of the
22See Appendix 4.9 for the instructions and Appendix 4.7 for the questionnaire.
23It is therefore possible that personality had an effect through first impressions even before the
subjects were told to talk to each other. E.g., it was shown by Willis and Todorov (2006) that
people are able to form first impressions within 100 milliseconds of exposure to a face. The analysis
of Section 2.4.3 explores the possibility that the effect of personality changed over time.
24This penny was added even if a slider was moved to position 49.
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team going bankrupt after 12 periods, in case that no prizes at all were discovered.
After observing how many “Top” sliders (i.e., sliders 1 through 12) and “Bottom”
sliders (i.e., sliders 13 through 24) the worker moved to position 50, as well as whether
or not the prize was found, the manager decided how much to pay the worker.25 This
payment could be any number of cents up to the amount of money the manager
accumulated so far. Thus, all of the manager’s start-up funds could be allocated
to the worker in the first period, terminating the experiment (because no money
is left to continue). On the other extreme, the manager could refrain from paying
the worker anything until the very last period. Crucially, decisions of the manager
were reversible: any money allocated to the worker by the manager (hence, excluding
the worker’s earnings from unadjusted sliders) could be taken back in a subsequent
period. Thus, the interaction mirrored a dictator game in that the manager could
appropriate the total surplus (minus one dollar, since the manager started out with
$5 and had to pay 40 cents in every period, including the first one) in the very last
period. After paying the worker, the manager decided what subset of sliders (Top or
Bottom) to recommend to the worker.
The location of the prize-winning slider changed pseudo-randomly according to a
Markov process with 75% transition probability for the state (whether the prize was
behind a Top slider or Bottom slider) being the same, although the subjects were not
informed of this.26 Conditional on the prize-winning slider a Top slider or a Bottom
slider, its location amongst the Top or Bottom sliders was otherwise determined with
equal probability of 1/12. Whether the prize was behind a Top slider or Bottom
slider was a common event for every team, but the location of the prize within the
Top or Bottom sliders was identically and independently distributed across teams.
Every five rounds, the teammates were allowed to talk, face-to-face, for three
minutes. Their instructions encouraged discussing the experimental task, but inter-
actions were otherwise unstructured. At the end of the match, subjects were asked
to complete a personality questionnaire on behalf of their partner. This concluded
the first half of the experiment. For the second half of the experiment, subjects were
randomly re-matched with player roles unchanged, so workers remained workers, and
25The manager had unlimited time to make all of her decisions.
26The instructions provided subjects with the following information (“Person A” corresponds to
the worker and “Person B” to the manager): “Whether the prize is behind a TOP/BOTTOM slider
in the next round only depends on where the prize was in this round. Person A will never know
where the prize is. At the end of every round, Person B will see whether or not the prize was
discovered. He/she will use this information to make recommendations to Person A.”
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the interaction described above was repeated.27
2.4 Results
172 subjects participated in eight experimental sessions, with session sizes ranging
from 10 to 26 subjects. Because each subject took part in two teams, each having
two members, this produced data for 172 matches. The remainder of this section
is devoted to our main result. A detailed description of the dataset as well as its
summary statistics can be found in Appendix 4.4.
2.4.1 Income, Inequality and Incentives
We focus on end-of-match outcomes in our statistical analysis. The variables of
interest are described below.
• Effort it: the number of sliders adjusted correctly by worker i in match t ∈ {1, 2}.
• Income it: worker i’s total earnings (including pennies for unadjusted sliders) in
match t, measured in dollars.
• Inequality it: the difference between the earnings of worker i and the earnings
of her manager in match t, measured in dollars.
• Output it: the number of prizes discovered by worker i’s team in match t.
• Recommendations it: the number of good recommendations made by i’s manager
in match t.
The summary statistics of these variable are provided in Table 6. The median
difference in earnings is nearly zero, suggesting that managers did keep fairness in
mind when deciding how much the worker should be rewarded. The experiment,
however, was successful in producing substantial variation in inequality (SD=5.975).
27The locations of the prize-winning slider were {Top, Top, Top, Bottom, Top, Bottom, Bottom,
Bottom, Bottom, Bottom, Bottom, Bottom, Top, Bottom, Top} in the first half of the experiment
and {Bottom, Bottom, Bottom, Top, Top, Bottom, Top, Top, Top, Top, Bottom, Bottom, Bottom,
Bottom, Bottom} in the second half. The two halves were otherwise identical in design.
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Although subjects’ interactions spanned two halves of the experiment, with a
different teammate in each, the distributions of the income, inequality, and output
variables did not differ across halves (P = 0.433 for income, P = 0.141 for inequality,
and P = 0.923 for output according to a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). Workers moved
more sliders in their second match, but the managers made worse recommendations,
and similar numbers of prizes were discovered. We discuss this in more detail in the
data appendix.
Mean SD Min. Max. Median P-value of K-S test
Effort 99.42 25.03 19 170 100 0.001
Income 8.396 3.952 2.330 19.91 8.100 0.433
Inequality -1.608 5.975 -18.91 14.55 -0.0550 0.141
Output 4.199 1.732 1 9 4 0.923
Recommendations 7.038 1.880 2 12 7 0.025
N 156
Table 6: Summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. For each variable,
the rightmost column reports the P-value of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test assessing
equality of distributions in the first and second half of the experiment.
Recall that a team could go bankrupt if no prize was discovered for 12 periods,
or if the manager did not leave herself enough money to continue to the next period
because too much had been allocated to the worker (e.g., the manager may not have
understood the instructions). Nine out of the 172 matches were confronted with the
former situation, and seven failed to find a prize and become bankrupt as a result.
All bankrupt matches were excluded from our subsequent analysis.
To identify how managers allocated output between themselves and their workers,
we estimated the following models:
Income it = α + βOutput it + it (2.1)
Inequality it = α + βOutput it + it (2.2)
These models suffer from a possible endogeneity issue because we can’t rule out that
the worker’s effort is rewarded (i.e., included in ), and workers are likely to respond
to higher incomes by working more. As an instrument for output, we used the
number of good recommendations given by the manager. This instrument is valid:
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Income Inequality
Output 1.412*** -1.267
(0.470) (0.947)
Constant 2.466 3.714
(1.864) (3.763)
F-statistic (first stage) 21.61 21.61
F-statistic (second stage) 8.071 1.602
Underidentification test 156 156
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 7: Managers rewarded workers for producing output. Note that while output
had a significant effect on workers’ incomes, it had no significant effect on inequality.
firstly, because better recommendations lead to more prizes being discovered, so the
instrument is correlated with output, and secondly because there is no reason to
think that how much the manager decides to pay the worker, conditional on output,
is correlated with how good the manager’s recommendations are. The reason for this
is that the number of good recommendations made by the manager is censored: The
manager only observes output, and never finds out how many good recommendations
were made when a prize was not discovered (unless, of course, a manager found the
prize in every period of a match, but this never occurred).
We estimated the model with two stage least squares, clustering the standard
errors by session.28 The results, reported in Table 7, show that the constant term
in this regression did not differ significantly from zero (P = 0.324), confirming the
observation that managers split the output evenly on average. While output had a
significant effect on the worker’s income (P < 0.01), it had no significant effect on the
inequality variable. I.e., variation in inequality could not be explained by variation
in output. We show below, however, that a significant portion of this variation could
be explained by the worker’s personality.
28We used session-robust standard errors in all of our statistical analysis.
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2.4.2 Correlations With Personality
We first assessed correlations of personality with income and inequality, using models
of the following form:
Income it = α + βΨit + γΦit + i (2.3)
Inequality it = α + βΨit + γΦit + i (2.4)
Ψit is a vector of i’s personality characteristics, as well as the personality charac-
teristics of her manager in match t, and Φi a vector of additional covariates, such
as output and physical traits (beauty and gender). Personality characteristics were
z−scored in our analysis; i.e., each trait had the sample average subtracted, and
the difference was divided by the standard deviation. A description of the beauty
and gender data is included in Appendix 4.4. Eight sessions are used in the regres-
sions where physical traits are included as controls. As discussed in the appendix,
time constraints prevented us from obtaining these data in the first two sessions,
although the sessions were identical to the others in all other respects. We consid-
ered several specifications of the models described above in addition to the baseline
regressions with γ = 0: (1) controlling for output, (2) controlling for physical traits
of the worker and manager, (3) controlling for output as well as physical traits. Note
that Inequality it = Output it − Income it. Therefore, using inequality as a dependent
variable without accounting for output is equivalent to using income as a dependent
variable and restricting the coefficient on output to be 1/2. This captures the hy-
pothesis that the manager “splits the pie” equally on average, while deviations from
this norm reflect influences of other factors such as the worker’s personality. When
output is included as a control, we report the results of the income regression.
Table 8 shows the results of two joint hypothesis tests for each of the considered
models. The first hypothesis is that the effect of every personality trait of the worker
is zero. The second is an analogous hypothesis concerning the effect of the manager’s
personality. The results, collected in Table 8, show that a worker’s personality traits
had a jointly significant effect on her earnings in every specification (largest P =
0.0201), while the joint effect of a manager’s traits on her income or experienced
inequality was always insignificant (smallest P = 0.1222). The finding that the
manager’s personality had no significant effect on income or inequality is consistent
with Morris et al. (1999), who argue that bargaining outcomes are often determined
by “situational” factors rather than own personality characteristics. Morris et al.
(1999), however, did not measure the effect of other people’s personality traits on
38
Additional controls Personality of worker Personality of manager Sessions N
None p = 0.0095 p = 0.1415 10 156
Output p = 0.0105 p = 0.1895 10 156
Physical traits p = 0.0022 p = 0.6333 8 123
Output and physical traits p = 0.0044 p = 0.4834 8 123
Additional controls Personality of worker Personality of manager Sessions N
None p = 0.0134 p = 0.5115 10 156
Physical traits p = 0.0201 p = 0.1222 8 123
Table 8: Correlations between personality and the worker’s income/average experi-
enced inequality. P statistics test the null hypothesis that the five personality traits
of the worker and manager, respectively, are jointly significant, after controlling for
(i) nothing else, (ii) output, (iii) physical traits (gender and beauty), and (iv) both
output and physical traits.
own bargaining decisions. To our knowledge, the finding that this effect is significant
has not been reported in the literature.
2.4.3 Identification
Correlations between personality traits and bargaining outcomes leave unsettled the
issue of causality. We used the variation in workers’ ratings of their managers, which
were related to workers’ agreeableness, to identify a causal effect of agreeableness
on earnings. Specifically, we estimated the following models of manager t’s payment
decision, using worker i’s evaluation of her other manager t′ as an instrument for
Agreeableness i:
Income it = α + βAgreeableness i + it (2.5)
Inequality it = α + βAgreeableness i + it (2.6)
The instrument we used requires justification. Recall that workers and managers
evaluated each other’s personalities through questionnaires at the end of each in-
teraction. As stated in DeYoung et al. (2007) (p. 883), “All of the positive poles
of the Big Five are socially desirable, whereas all of the negative poles are socially
undesirable (Neuroticism is reversed [...] and labeled Emotional Stability).” We de-
fine Desirability it′ , i’s expressed desirability of manager t
′, as the sum of worker i’s
ratings of this manager’s extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness and openness
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minus her rating of the manager’s neuroriticism, and use it to instrument for the
effect of i’s agreeableness on the payment decision of manager t. This is valid for two
reasons. First, Desirability it′ is highly correlated with i’s agreeableness (ρ = 0.3869,
P < 0.001). In Section 2.4.4, we study this relationship in more detail and argue
that while the worker’s reported perceptions of her manager’s personality are corre-
lated with agreeableness, they are not correlated with other personality traits of the
worker. Second, since workers and managers were randomly matched, it is reasonable
to assume that E[Desirability it′ · it|Agreeableness i] = 0, where t′ 6= t. In words, this
assumption amounts to claiming that—conditional on the worker’s agreeableness—
just how a manager pays a given worker is independent of how the worker rates the
other manager to whom she is matched in the other half of the experiment.
Income Inequality Income Inequality
Agreeableness -1.659 -2.523** -1.356** -2.761**
(1.081) (0.982) (0.563) (1.187)
Output 1.474*** -1.161
(0.490) (0.992)
Constant 8.660**** -1.303* 2.385 3.640
(0.472) (0.680) (1.971) (4.005)
F-statistic (first stage, agreeableness) 21.10 21.10 20.02 20.02
F-statistic (first stage, output) 18.31 18.31
F-statistic (second stage) 2.106 5.902 6.289 3.150
Underidentification test 0.0205 0.0205 0.0155 0.0155
Observations 154 154 154 154
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 9: The effect of the worker’s agreeableness on her bargaining power, with the
worker’s rating of the (other) manager used as an instrument.
We estimated the model described above with two stage least squares and session-
clustered standard errors. Workers in several teams provided the same answer (“Nei-
ther Agree Nor Disagree”) for every question regarding their boss, and these teams
were excluded from the sample. The coefficient estimates are reported in Table 20.
While the worker’s agreeableness had a significant effect on her experienced inequality
(P < 0.05), the coefficient in the income regression was not significant (P = 0.142).
All standard tests of instrument validity were passed by these specifications: the P -
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value of the Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test was equal to 0.0205, and the
first stage F -statistic was 21.10, suggesting that the instrument for agreeableness was
not weak.
When we re-estimated the model including output (measured in terms of the
number of discovered prizes) as an additional control, and using the manager’s rec-
ommendation an an instrument for output, we found the effect of agreeableness to
be significant in both specifications (P < 0.05). The null hypothesis of underiden-
tification was rejected with P = 0.0155. The multivariate first stage F-statistics of
Angrist and Pischke (2008) were 20.02 for agreeableness and 18.31 for output.
Notice that the point estimates were quite similar for models with and without
output included as a control (-1.659 and -1.356 for income; -2.523 and -2.761 for
inequality). These point estimates, considered together with mean earnings of 8.396
reported in Table 6, suggest that the worker’s income decreased by 16%-20% per
standard deviation of agreeableness. Thus, the effect of agreeableness on the man-
ager’s decision was economically as well as statistically significant. We highlight this
finding below as our first major result:
Result 1. The worker’s agreeableness caused the worker to be paid
significantly less by her manager.
If the effect of agreeableness on the worker’s earnings was due to face-to-face
interactions with the manager, one may hypothesize that this effect strengthened with
the number of interactions as subjects became acquainted with their team members
and gradually assimilated their personality traits. To study the dynamics of the effect
of agreeableness over time, we estimated the marginal effect of agreeableness on the
manager’s decision for each period of the interaction. I.e., we re-estimated the models
described above taking income and inequality in periods preceding the very last one.
This led to 30 regressions. An additional 30 regressions included output as a control,
with the manager’s recommendations serving as an instrument as before.
We plot the coefficients on agreeableness together with 95% confidence intervals in
Figure 4. In every panel of the figure, the marginal effect of agreeableness was indis-
tinguishable from zero for the first several periods of the interaction.29 With time, the
29One exception is the specification where inequality is used as a dependent variable and output
is not controlled for, where the effect of agreeableness was significant at a 10% level in the very first
period. In the second period, however, the largest P -value is equal to 0.631 in any model.
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Figure 4: The change in the marginal effect of agreeableness over time. 95% confi-
dence intervals are plotted around the marginal effects at each period of the interac-
tion.
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effect grew more negative, and eventually reached significance. When inequality was
the dependent variable, it became significant only at the very end of the interaction;
when the dependent variable was income, it became significant earlier. Note that
even when income serving as the dependent variable and output not controlled for,
the effect of agreeableness was significant in several late periods of the interaction.
We take the finding that the effect of agreeableness became stronger over time to be
our second major result, highlighted below.
Result 2. The effect of agreeableness was insignificant during the
beginning of the interaction, but grew in magnitude and became sig-
nificant over time.
We interpret this result as evidence for the hypothesis that it took time for the
manager to become acquainated with her worker’s personality and respond to it.
2.4.4 Evaluation of Others Through Questionnaires
We now turn to the analysis of subjects’ perceptions of their teammates. Three
subjects entered the same answer (“Neither Agree Nor Disagree”) for every item in
the survey they filled out on their teammate’s behalf; these subjects were excluded
from subsequent analysis. To study the relationship between the worker’s perception
of the manager and personality, we estimated regressions of the following sort:
Perception itk = α + βΨit + it, (2.7)
where Perception itk stands for i’s perception of the k
th trait of manager t. The results
are reported in Table 10. We found that agreeable workers saw their teammates
as being more open (P < 0.01), more conscientious (P < 0.01), more extraverted
(P < 0.1), less neurotic (P < 0.001), and more agreeable (P < 0.01). Thus, agreeable
workers perceived their managers as being more socially desirable, i.e., liked them
more. This is confirmed in the last column of the table, where the worker’s expressed
affinity of the manager is regressed against the same explanatory variables. We take
this to be our third major finding.
Result 3. Agreeable workers expressed more positive ratings of
their teammates’ personalities.
Note that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the effect of personality traits other
than agreeableness on the worker’s evaluation of the manager was zero. Thus, to the
43
Perc. N. Perc. A. Perc. C. Perc. E. Perc. O. Desirability
N. of worker 0.0871* -0.00422 -0.104*** -0.0642 -0.0581 -0.318
(0.0472) (0.0907) (0.0276) (0.0561) (0.0383) (0.216)
A. of worker -0.189**** 0.244*** 0.142*** 0.125* 0.144*** 0.844****
(0.0330) (0.0590) (0.0424) (0.0661) (0.0429) (0.154)
C. of worker 0.0294 0.0227 -0.0108 0.00775 -0.0153 -0.0251
(0.0433) (0.0937) (0.0334) (0.0682) (0.0722) (0.245)
E. of worker -0.0325 0.00323 0.0637 0.0415 0.0970* 0.238
(0.0508) (0.0775) (0.0479) (0.0369) (0.0492) (0.199)
O. of worker 0.0634 0.0514 0.0321 -0.0249 0.0945** 0.0897
(0.0456) (0.0741) (0.0596) (0.0401) (0.0396) (0.119)
N. of manager 0.0418 -0.00316 0.0380 -0.0488 0.0389 -0.0168
(0.0418) (0.0396) (0.0467) (0.0429) (0.0410) (0.104)
A. of manager 0.00343 0.0397 -0.0680 0.0490 -0.00954 0.00773
(0.0403) (0.0587) (0.0451) (0.0650) (0.0534) (0.210)
C. of manager 0.0290 0.0283 0.0321 -0.0608 -0.0252 -0.0545
(0.0341) (0.0531) (0.0381) (0.0569) (0.0297) (0.118)
E. of manager -0.0812 0.00231 -0.00175 0.118** 0.0482 0.248
(0.0486) (0.0522) (0.0236) (0.0419) (0.0360) (0.151)
O. of manager 0.0541 -0.111* 0.0125 -0.0865* 0.0219 -0.217
(0.0411) (0.0520) (0.0306) (0.0439) (0.0348) (0.155)
Constant 2.556**** 3.505**** 3.568**** 3.257**** 3.419**** 11.19****
(0.0334) (0.0479) (0.0527) (0.0745) (0.0624) (0.214)
Observations 154 154 154 154 154 154
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 10: The worker’s perceptions and personality traits of both teammates.
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extent that the worker was rewarded for her positive perception of the manager, this
was outweighed by a disagreeableness premium. Our interpretation is that managers
found agreeable workers more willing to accept harsher terms, and hence paid them
less.
2.4.5 Robustness Checks
Our main estimation results are reported in Table 8 and Table 7 under several specifi-
cations. These results survived additional robustness checks such as including session
and half fixed effects. These robustness checks are collected in Appendix 4.5. The
effect of agreeableness on inequality remained significant when we measured inequal-
ity as the share of output allocated to the worker and estimated the model with two
stage least squares. Such a specification, however, is problematic because this depen-
dent variable takes on values in the unit interval (Papke and Woolridge, 2008); we
therefore take our inequality variable (difference in earnings) to be a more natural
unit of analysis. When we used the worker’s reported perceptions of the manager’s
five traits as instruments, instead of aggregating them into a desirability variable, the
effects of agreeableness on bargaining outcomes remained significant and comparable,
although the first stage F-statistics suggested that perceptions of some traits were
only weakly correlated with agreeableness once perceptions of the other traits were
taken into account. We therefore use our aggregated measure of perception, which
has a natural interpretation as an index of social desirability, and which survived all
standard tests of instrument validity, as an instrument in the main text.
2.4.6 The Worker’s Effort
The preceding analysis focused on the decisions of the manager. We also studied the
worker’s effort decisions, and their relation to personality. We did not find strong evi-
dence to support the hypothesis that either the worker’s or the manager’s personality
affected the worker’s effort.
Did workers respond to incentives? To answer this question, we estimated the
following model:
Effort it = α + βIncome it + it. (2.8)
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Effort Effort Effort
Income 4.660**** 4.479****
(0.450) (0.595)
Agreeableness -2.417 4.470
(9.739) (6.915)
Constant 60.30**** 99.74**** 61.23****
(5.794) (3.339) (5.861)
F-statistic (first stage, income) 87.99 91.67
F-statistic (first stage, agreeableness) 22.55 55.02
F-statistic (second stage) 95.77 0.0551 55.02
Underidentification test 0.0037 0.0192 0.0193
Observations 156 156 156
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 11: Determinants of the worker’s effort.
Because effort is likely to be rewarded by the manager, this model is subject to a
potential endogeneity issue. To address this concern, we used output as an instrument
for income. On the one hand, output and income are highly correlated. On the other
hand, output was not observed by the worker, and hence should be uncorrelated with
the worker’s effort decision conditional on income. We note, however, that the latter
assumption is not innocuous. In particular, it is possible that the worker’s effort
was influenced by what the manager told the worker, making the latter variable
correlated with output. The two stage least squares estimation results, reported in
Table 11, demonstrate that higher incomes induced the workers to exert more effort
(P < 0.001), providing some evidence that the worker’s effort was influenced by her
income.
We find no significant correlation between the worker’s effort and her own per-
sonality. The results of hypothesis tests analogous to those shown in Table 8 with
income and inequality as dependent variables are reported in Table 19.30 The second
30Note, however, that these correlations show that the worker’s effort was correlated with the
manager’s personality at a 10% level. When the manager’s agreeableness was included as a covariate
in the model described by Equation 2.8—with the manager’s perception of the worker in the other
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column of Table 11 reports the results of a regression that adds agreeableness to the
model described by Equation 2.8. The results of this regression showed agreeable-
ness to have no significant effect on effort (P = 0.518), providing additional evidence
that the effect of the worker’s agreeableness on the manager’s decisions cannot be
attributed to differences in the worker’s productivity.
Additional controls Personality of worker Personality of manager Sessions N
None p = 0.3164 p = 0.0745 10 156
Physical traits p = 0.1102 p = 0.0684 8 123
Table 12: Correlations between personality and the worker’s effort.
2.5 Conclusion
We studied the effect of personality on bargaining power in a controlled experiment,
designed to broadly reflect team production in an organization. The combined results
reported in this paper point to three main observations: (i) agreeableness of an indi-
vidual at the bottom of a given hierarchical relationship is associated with decreased
bargaining power, (ii) this effect becomes stronger as the individual’s personality is
learned, and (iii) the effect is not due to the fact that agreeable individuals tend to
view their superiors more favorably. Agreeableness is typically defined as “the ten-
dency to act in a cooperative, unselfish manner” (Becker et al., 2012, Table A.1). We
suggest that this tendency is perceived by managers, and, perhaps subconsciously,
exploited.
In the future, it would be interesting to relax the bargaining problem we stud-
ied here and understand just how robust our results are to specific details of the
economic environment. For instance, although we held the hierarchy fixed in our
experiment, some evidence suggests that personality is related with status-seeking
behavior (Kyl-Heku and Buss, 1996), and, hence, one’s status too. Therefore, the
effect of personality on a typical organization is likely to be much more complex
than the one observed in this paper. Nevertheless, an important motivation of this
study is to open the door for detailed experimental analysis of personality in environ-
ments that are both strategic and not anonymous, as is the case in many important
economic relationships. Potential applications of this idea range from a deeper under-
half used as an instrument—we found no significant causal effect.
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standing of earnings determination in organizations to the relevance of Luxembourg
in European politics.
Finally, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that disagreeable workers exhibited
characteristic behavioral traits that were effectively unobserved to us as experimenters
(speaking in a louder voice, etc.). The goal of this study was to investigate the
effect of other people’s personality on one’s economic decisions, rather than trying to
understand in depth the channels through which personality traits express themselves.
Understanding these channels more deeply, as well as how they interact with strategic
considerations, seems to us an exciting topic for future research.
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3 Cooperative Institutions31
3.1 Introduction
Cooperative agreements are often complicated by limitations on how much informa-
tion is available to the parties involved. Firms in an industry attempting to collude,
for example, cannot reliably verify every relevant decision made by their competi-
tors. Likewise, leaders of governments have an imperfect assessment of each other’s
actions. To sustain cooperation, firms form trade associations and heads of state hold
regular meetings to share information and coordinate their actions. How can efficient
outcomes be sustained in an environment with imperfect monitoring? We address
this question with a controlled experiment that assesses two canonical information
management institutions: information delay and communication.
Delay of information is ubiquitous. Company bonuses to CEOs are given on a
yearly basis. The G20 meetings, which from 2008 to 2011 were held on a semi-annual
basis, now take place annually. The Kyoto Protocol, a global initiative to reduce
emissions of greenhouse gases, establishes two commitment periods for the member
countries: 2008-2012 and 2013-2020. A theoretical justification for delay is that it can
help overcome the bounds on welfare imposed by inefficient provision of incentives.
For concreteness, consider a repeated game with imperfect monitoring in which a
noisy public signal of the chosen action profile arrives every period. The monitoring
technology can be such that under public equilibria,32 welfare is bounded away from
efficiency by a substantial amount (Fudenberg et al., 1994; Sannikov and Skrzypacz,
2007). Near efficiency, however, is possible if the signal is delayed, i.e., if players
receive several signals at a time instead of receiving a signal every period. This point
was first made by Lehrer (1989) and Abreu et al. (1991) and has since become a
standard technique in the theoretical literature on repeated games, especially in the
study of both private monitoring and private strategies.33 This literature exploits
the delay of endogenous information: private signals and actions of other players.
Intuitively, without delay, public equilibrium requires that both players are punished
for a “bad” signal in every period it is observed. If the signal is shown every two
31Joint work with David Rahman.
32Intuitively, public equilibrium means behavior only depends on public information. By imperfect
monitoring, past behavior is not public information, so players cannot react to their own past actions.
33See, for instance, Compte (1998); Ely et al. (2005); Ho¨rner and Olszewski (2006); Kandori and
Obara (2006).
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periods, punishment can be triggered (with some probability) by two instances of bad
news. Longer delays allow performance to be reviewed more efficiently.
Communication, likewise, is a pervasive element of human interaction, and ex-
periments have shown that it leads to improved welfare and coordination (a review
of this literature can be found in Crawford, 1998). Although most of the theoretical
literature on communication or “cheap talk” (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) emphasizes
limitations to information sharing when incentives are misaligned, the literature con-
cludes that some communication is often better than none at all. In the context of
repeated games, however, subjects’ payoffs are bounded away from efficiency if public
equilibria are played, and this is true irrespective of the ability to communicate.34
We design the experiment around a prisoner’s dilemma game played repeatedly
with imperfect monitoring and frequent actions elapsing at a rate of 0.15 seconds
per period. Because one of our main goals is to see whether players take advantage
of delay, this environment is particularly appropriate. With our chosen parameters,
the efficient level of welfare is 30 and welfare levels above 20 cannot be sustained
according in public equilibrium according to standard theory. In the treatments with
delay, information arrives in 100 period blocks, making it possible to sustain welfare
levels above 29. A game with a small number of periods would make the benefits of
delay substantially less stark.
The experiment is described in detail in Section 3.3, but its basic features are
the following. Subjects are randomly and anonymously matched into groups of two
and earn points depending on the group’s chosen action profile. Instead of observing
the other player’s actions, each subject observes a noisy public signal that has a
positive drift if and only if both matched players cooperate. In the treatment without
delay (treatment N), the public signal is shown in real time. In the treatment with
delay (treatment D), the signal is shown in 100 period (15 second) windows. Two
additional treatments allow subjects to their strategies with (treatment DC) and
34Some papers have explored communication as a useful tool for augmenting the set of equilibrium
outcomes by allowing strategies to depend on the communicated information (e.g., Compte, 1998;
Kandori and Matsushima, 1998; Obara, 2009). Kandori (2003) studies a repeated game with public
monitoring and proves a folk theorem with communication in this environment. Although Kandori’s
result requires more than two players, one can ask if a version of his solution is applicable to our
example. It is shown in Rahman (2013a), however, that a folk theorem in public communication
equilibria requires that the drift when both players defect differs from the drift with unilateral
defection, a condition which is violated by our monitoring technology. The public equilibrium
bound on payoffs persists.
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without (treatment NC) delay of information.
With frequent actions, the bound on public Nash equilibrium payoffs can also be
overcome with bounded rationality. If actions cannot be changed every period (e.g.,
because of physical constraints on reaction times), the players observe several signals
before making their next decisions, and this bundling together of information makes
welfare levels above 20 sustainable in equilibrium. For example, if it takes players five
periods to respond, they can use a trigger strategy which starts off by cooperating
and continues to do so as long as anything other than five bad signals is observed
and defects with some probability if five bad signals are observed. To test whether
bounded rationality affects behavior, we introduce a slow treatment (treatment S)
that is identical to the baseline no delay, no communication case in all respects by
two: a period lasts for a whole second, rather than 0.15 seconds, and the exchange
rate between points and dollars is adjusted to equalize earnings per unit of time.
Our main results are the following:
Result 1. Delay of information hinders cooperation.
Result 2. Communication improves cooperation, allowing players
to exceed the public equilibrium bound on payoffs.
Result 3. Giving players more time to think about their choices has
no effect on behavior.
The finding that delay leads to a decrease in welfare cannot be explained by
(public) ε-equilibria, where each player is a small distance away from playing a best
response to the other player’s strategy.35 Friedman and Oprea (2012), the first paper
to systematically examine behavior in a continuous time prisoners’ dilemma (with
perfect monitoring), provides a useful reference point for this observation. The paper
finds median cooperation rates above 90% in continuous time and provides a theo-
retical model to explain this data, building on earlier work by Radner (1986) and
Simon and Stinchcombe (1989). Focusing on cut-off strategies K(s) with conditional
cooperation until time s and unconditional defection thereafter, the authors show
that ε-equilibria are consistent with their experiment’s results.
Our results provide several counterpoints to this conclusion. First, when imperfect
35This is because the result that near efficiency can be sustained with delay is robust to small
mistakes.
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monitoring is introduced in an otherwise similar environment, (public) ε-equilibria
cannot explain the observed behavioral regularities. The heart of Friedman and
Oprea’s argument was that frequent actions permitted players to punish deviations
quickly, rendering them unprofitable. With imperfect monitoring, it takes time to
recognize a deviation, and as a result reacting quickly loses its power. In fact, we
found no significant difference in cooperation rates between our slow (1 period per
second) and fast (6 periods per second) treatment. Arguably, subjects cannot react
to information at the rate of 1/6th of a second, so via this form bounded rationality,
their ability to react promptly to deviations was limited more in the fast treatment
than in the slow treatment. Nevertheless, cooperation rates were not significantly
different. Secondly, since Friedman and Oprea (2012) studied perfect monitoring,
deviations could be detected precisely in their experiments. On the other hand,
in our experiments imperfect monitoring made it impossible for players to detect
perfectly the behavior of their opponents. They needed repeated observations to
make confident judgments regarding their opponents’ behavior.
That delay of information leads to significant losses in welfare is our paper’s main
contribution. It has been pointed out that the efficiency gains associated with delay
in Abreu et al. (1991) may in practice be counteracted by the benefits of receiving
frequent feedback (Levin, 2003). In the context of a laboratory experiment, we find
that this is indeed the case. Our results are in broad agreement with important
findings in the industrial organization literature, which treats communication and
information sharing as canonical ways of sustaining collusion (Feuerstein, 2005). In
this line of research, there exist important examples of collusive institutions that
choose not to delay noisy information. The Joint Executive Committee, a well-
known railroad cartel which controlled much of railroad shipment in late nineteenth
century United States, published weekly statistics that allowed cartel members to
check on each other weekly (Ulen, 1980). Indeed, according to Porter (2005), “the
cartel formation process [...] involves more than the issues studied in the repeated
games literature. Dampening the short run incentives to cheat is only one facet
of a cartels problems.” We agree with this assessment and take our experimental
results to point to the following basic fact: Contrary to standard theory, management
of exogenous information can decrease welfare, while an institution that allows for
additional information to be generated endogenously can lead to significant welfare
benefits.
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3.2 Related work
3.2.1 Experimental literature
There is a small but growing experimental literature on repeated games played with
frequent actions. Friedman and Oprea (2012) showed that cooperation rates in a
prisoner’s dilemma are higher when the game is played in quasi-continuous time than
when time is discrete. Bigoni et al. (2011) compared the effects of fixed and random
termination times in the same setting, extending related experiments of Dal Bo´ (2005)
conducted in discrete time. Oprea et al. (2011) used a continuous “hawk-dave” game
in an experimental test of evolutionary game theory. We follow the basic methodology
established in these studies: An action is assumed to be fixed until changed by the
subject, while payoff stocks are updated every period, which in our case lasts 0.15
seconds.
While subjects observed their partner’s choices in these studies, other experiments,
in both discrete and continuous time, made use of imperfect monitoring. Aoyagi
and Fre´chette (2009) showed that welfare decreases in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma
as the public signal becomes more noisy. Ambrus and Greiner (2012) studied the
relationship between welfare and the severity of a punishment technology in a public
good game. Bigoni et al. (2012) found that action frequency has a nonlinear impact
on collusion when payoffs are updated in a quasi-continuous manner and monitoring
is noisy.
Our study is the first to implement imperfect monitoring and information delay in
a theoretically structured manner. Cason and Khan (1999) delayed the announcement
of other subjects’ contributions in a public good game, interpreting information delay
as an imperfect monitoring technology. As pointed out in Aoyagi and Fre´chette
(2009), such an interpretation of imperfect monitoring is at odds with the way the
former is construed in theory. Moreover, information aggregation is irrelevant in a
setting without noise.
Our experiment also manipulates subjects’ ability to communicate. The experi-
mental literature on communication is vast and dates back to at least Dawes et al.
(1977). Studies in this line typically find that communication increases cooperation
rates amongst experimental participants. This finding, however, comes with some
qualifications. Charness (2000), for instance, found that “minimalist” communication
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protocols that allow players to announce their strategies are ineffective at improving
cooperation rates in a one shot prisoner’s dilemma. Ben-Ner et al. (2007) found that
numerical messages are much less effective than verbal ones at encouraging trusting
and trustworthy behavior in a trust game. Charness et al. (2012) employed a design
manipulating the subjects’ ability to communicate in a freeform manner and the rate
at which periods elapsed, and found that communication had a much greater effect
on contributions in continuous than in discrete time. This study relates to ours only
loosely. First, it utilizes a setting with perfect monitoring. Second, the communi-
cation technology employed in our study is closer to the “minimalist” protocol of
Charness (2000) or the numerical protocol of Ben-Ner et al. (2007) than the type of
free-form communication employed in Charness et al. (2012).
3.2.2 Theoretical literature
The theoretical literature on repeated games with frequent actions is also small, recent
and growing. With perfect monitoring, Simon and Stinchcombe (1989) developed an
influential idea for sustaining cooperation in a Prisoners’ Dilemma with finite horizon,
assuming a form of bounded rationality. Specifically, they assume that players can
only react to their observations with some fixed delay. As actions become arbitrarily
frequent, for any fixed delay in reaction times they show that it is possible to sustain
cooperation in a Prisoners’ Dilemma—even if the horizon is fixed and finite.
Although Radner (1986) focused on the discrete time case, his results apply36
just as much to games with frequent actions. He points out the discontinuity in the
equilibrium payoff correspondence from an arbitrarily large but finite horizon to an
infinite horizon, and then offers three different ways of restoring continuity. First,
by introducing reputation, as in the famous “gang of four” papers (e.g., Kreps et al.,
1982), cooperation becomes possible. Second, relaxing the behavioral predictions to
ε-equilibria allows for some cooperation in equilibrium. Third, if players’ strategies
are subject to being “executed” by finite state automata with a fixed upper bound
on their number of states, thencontinuity of the equilibrium payoff correspondence is
again restored with respect to the horizon.
Friedman and Oprea (2012) use these interesting results to understand their exper-
imental results in a theoretically structured manner. They emphasize a combination
36Radner (1986) attributes some of the findings in his paper to others; see his paper for references.
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of ε-equilibrium and delayed reaction as a way of explaining the behavior of subjects
in their experiment. However, none of the arguments mentioned above generalize
immediately to games with imperfect monitoring, and no such extension exists in
the literature. Such a generalization is an interesting open problem that we leave for
future research. On the other hand, our results seem to rule out both ε-equilibrium
and finite automata arguments as drivers for cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma
with imperfect monitoring: In theory, delay ought to add value even in ε-equilibrium
and regardless of the feasible complexity of a strategy.
The existing literature on repeated games with imperfect monitoring has a long
history by now, perhaps most notably Radner et al. (1986), Abreu et al. (1986, 1990),
Abreu et al. (1991), as well as Fudenberg et al. (1994). Relatively recently, Sannikov
(2007); Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007, 2010) and Fudenberg and Levine (2007, 2009)
extended these techniques and results to games with both frequent actions and im-
perfect monitoring. A crucial assumption that is made in all of these papers is that
players behave according to (perfect) public Nash equilibrium. This restriction on
the set of equilibria facilitates formal analysis of sustainable payoffs, often with stark
behavioral predictions. For instance, according to Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007),
collusion is impossible in a repeated Cournot oligopoly with flexible production, and
the amount of cooperation that is sustainable in the Prisoners’ Dilemma is severely
limited in public Nash equilibrium. This is shown in Proposition 1 below.
There is substantial theoretical precedent for the question of how exogenous de-
lay of information helps players sutain cooperation. Starting from Lehrer (1989) and
Abreu et al. (1991), the idea that players can attain better social outcomes by de-
laying and lumping information into blocks has been widely accepted and applied
in various contexts. Thus, “block” strategies have been used to sustain socially de-
sirable outcomes in Kandori and Matsushima (1998), Compte (1998), Obara (2008),
Ely et al. (2005), Sugaya (2010) and others. Although none of these “cooperative
institutions” survive in repeated games with frequent actions, it can be shown that
even with frequent actions delay can still help (Rahman, 2013b)—at least in theory.
3.3 Experimental design
All treatments were programmed using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007b) and implemented
with a between-group design following all standard practices of experimental eco-
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nomics. The experiment had four treatments, described in detail below. Upon signing
their consent forms, subjects in every treatment obtained a paper copy of the instruc-
tions and were shown a pre-recorded Power Point presentation explaining their task.
They then played a two player repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with imperfect monitor-
ing and frequent actions through a computerized interface. Appendix 4.9 provides
the instructions to the NC treatment.37
In all treatments other than treatment S, a time period lasted ∆t = 0.15 seconds.
At the beginning of each match, subjects chose between pressing an orange button
(“cooperate”) and a purple button (“defect”). After their initial choice, they could
change their selection at any time and as often as they wanted. Not pressing any
buttons during a time period amounted to maintaining their last recorded choice.
Following one practice match, subjects were randomly and anonymously matched
several times. In every period, the probability of a match terminating was 1/700.
Following Murnighan and Roth (1983), we identify the continuation probability with
the discount factor. The first match to end after 45 minutes elapsed since the begin-
ning of the experiment marked the end of a session. If subject were in mid-match
at 50 minutes after the experiment begin, we overrode the random termination rule
and terminated the match randomly. Payment consisted of the final payoff from a
randomly selected match, converted from points to dollars at the exchange raint of
40 (treatments N and D) or 20 (treatments NC and DC) points per cent.
Depending on whether she chose to cooperate (Cit) or defect (Dit), subject i’s
stock of points increased by uit in period t according to the following table:
C D
C 15, 15 0, 20
D 20, 0 2, 2
Subjects did not find out their earnings until the end of the session, at which
point they received their accumulated earnings
∑
uit(at) from every match. Instead
of observing her partner’s actions, each subject was shown a public signal that could
go up with probability p(at) or down with probability 1−p(at), with p(at) determined
as in the table below:
37The instructions to treatments with delay differ in that the sentence “The process will be
displayed in real time, in blocks of 100 periods” in the “Information” section is replaced by “You will
only observe the evolution of this process at the end of each block of 100 periods.” The instructions
to treatments N and D omit the “Communication” section.
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C D
C 3
4
1
2
D 1
2
1
2
Conditional probability p of the good signal
In treatment N, information arrived continuously, and in treatment D it arrived at
the end of each 100 period (15 second) block, when it was revealed in five three second-
long lumps. In both treatments, points were converted to dollars at an exchange rate
of 40 points per cent. In treatment S, information also arrived continuously, but a
time period lasted for ∆t = 1 second. The continuation probability (discount factor)
was identical to that in the other treatments, but points were converted to dollars at
an exchange rate of 6 points per cent. This ensured that earnings per unit of time
were the same.38 The slow treatment also had 150 (unpaid) periods in the practice
match, compared to 250 in the other treatments. This ensured that the practice
match does not go on for an unnecessarily long length of time, but that the players
still get an opportunity to experience a match with more than one 100-period block.
Treatments NC and DC allowed subjects to communicate cut-off strategies in
an environment without (NC) and with (DC) delay of the public signal. Because
communication made each match longer, we introduced a more generous exchange
rate in these treatments to help smooth out earnings across sessions: 20, rather than
40 points, were converted into a cent. In all treatments of the experiment, subjects
pressed a “continue” button every 100 periods–at the end of each 15 second block.
This block structure was introduced to minimize the difference between the differences
between ways in which information is presented in treatments with and without delay.
Note that it leaves our theoretical predictions unaltered.
The communication in these treatments took place at the beginning of each match,
before subjects took their initial actions, and at the end of each 100 period block. At
the beginning of the match, subjects provided answers to the following questions:
• This block, I will choose ORANGE this percentage of the time: %
• If this block’s signal position is [above/below] the number , I will respond
38(1/40) cents/point x 15 points/period x (1/.15) periods/second = 2.5 cents/second. To make the
slow world the same, change the exchange rate to ((1/40) x (1/.15)) cents/point x 15 points/period
x 1 period/second = 2.5 cents/second.
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Beginning of match:
Mid-block:
End of block:
Figure 5: Screenshots of the first block in treatment N (no delay, no communication).
In the beginning of each match, a subject selects her initial action (top). She then plays a prisoner’s
dilemma game with imperfect monitoring, in which a common signal of the chosen action profile is
observed (middle, bottom). The player is allowed to change her action as often as she desires in the
course of the game (middle). Every 15 seconds, the player presses a “continue” button (bottom),
which erases past signals from the display.
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by choosing ORANGE this percentage of the time in the following block: %.
Otherwise, I will choose ORANGE this percentage of the time: %
After everyone submitted their answers and initial actions, subjects saw their part-
ner’s answers displayed on the screen for 30 seconds. When this screen timed out, the
game began to elapse. At the end of each 100 period block, subjects were given an
opportunity to revise their answers. After everyone’s new answers were submitted,
each subject looked their partner’s new answers for 15 seconds before the next block
started.
3.4 Theoretical predictions
From the point of view of the theory, the modeling choice of imperfect monitoring
with frequent actions is useful for three reasons. First, it is consistent with many
real-world applications. Second, it disciplines the design of institutions considerably
by forcing them to be robust to the friction of a fixed period length by discouraging
infinitesimal deviations.39 Third, it delivers a mathematically tractable analysis of
the problem. We now describe the theoretical considerations relevant to our study.
3.4.1 Public equilibrium payoffs
The study of public equilibria is practically the norm in repeated games, especially
those with frequent actions. As such, it is important to understand the restriction
that such equilibria impose on equilibrium payoffs. Fortunately, their recursive nature
deliver a simple, partial identification for public equilibria: the maximal payoff under
public equilibria is given by 20 points per period. This claim is proved in the following
proposition, see Figure 6 below for a graphical illustration.
Proposition 1. Let γ(δ) = max{v1 + v2 : v ∈ E(δ)}, where E(δ) is the set of public
equilibrium payoff vectors of the game with discount factor δ < 1. Then, γ(δ) ≤ 20
for every δ. This bound continues to hold in public communication equilibrium.
39This rules out most of the institutions in the game theory literature, including Abreu et al.
(1991) to Compte (1998), Kandori and Matsushima (1998), Ely et al. (2005), Ho¨rner and Olszewski
(2006), Sugaya (2010) and beyond.
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Figure 6: Flow payoffs in the Prisoners’ Dilemma with two players
Note that Proposition 1 delivers the same theoretical bound for both public Nash
equilibrium and public communication equilibrium. This is due to the particular
choice of information structure in our experiment, where the probability of good
news is the same if there is only one cooperator or none at all. Therefore, the fact
that our treatment with communication exceeded the welfare bound of 20 is not
consistent with public communication equilibrium.
3.4.2 How information delay can help
The insight that lumping information together may improve incentives is not new,
dating back at least to Lehrer (1989).40 For our purposes, the construction due to
Abreu et al. (1991) is a particularly useful way of describing it.
Suppose that, instead of the signal arriving every period, it was possible to lump
the information in such a way that the signal only arrived at the end of every T -
period block. Abreu et al. (1991) show how players can improve upon a welfare
of 20 by delaying information this way. Consider the following strongly symmetric
strategies, to be called AMP block strategies. Every player cooperates for T periods.
At the end of the T -period block, the T public signals for each period in the block
40Lehrer (1989) studied repeated games without discounting, though.
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arrive to the players. If every signal was bad then continuation play consists of mutual
defection henceforth with some probability α. Otherwise, they continue to cooperate
for the next block with the same contingency.
DD∞
CCT 1−α
αbT
¬bT
CCT
CCT
Figure 7: AMP block strategies (bT = T bad signals)
The probability of T consecutive bad signals equals qT2 in equilibrium, that is,
assuming mutual cooperation throughout the block. A player’s lifetime utility under
this strategy profile is therefore given by
v = (1− δT )15 + δT [(1− qT2 )v + qT2 ((1− α)v + 2α)].
Rearranging,
v = 15− δ
T
1− δT q
T
2 α(v − 2). (3.1)
Discouraging a deviation in the very first period of the block requires that the
utility gained from defecting, (1 − δ)5, be outweighed by the associated loss in con-
tinuation payoff. This is given by the change in probability of punishment from
the one-period deviation, qT−12 (q1 − q2), times the opportunity cost of punishment,
δTα(v − 2). Since q1 − q2 = .25 = q2, this incentive constraint may be written as
(1− δ)5 ≤ δT qT2 α(v − 2). (3.2)
A key insight behind the welfare properties of AMP block strategies is that discourag-
ing one deviation discourages all others, as the next result shows. The intuition for it
is this. The gains from deviating grow linearly, whereas the costs grow exponentially
in the number of deviations. Therefore discouraging one deviation discourages them
all.
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Lemma 1. If the AMP block strategies above discourage a deviation in any single
period of a block then they discourage every deviation, that is, they constitute an
equilibrium.
Consider maximizing v, the strongly symmetric equilibrium payoffs above, with
respect to α such that the AMP block strategies above remain an equilibrium. At an
optimum, the incentive constraint (3.2) must bind, since otherwise by (3.1) we would
be able to feasibly lower α further and increase v, contradicting optimality. If (3.2)
binds then the maximum value of v equals
v = 15− 5 1− δ
1− δT .
On the other hand, feasibility requires that α ≤ 1, since it is a probability. Sub-
stituting for v and this inequality in (3.2) and rearranging gives
5(1− δ)
[
1
1− δT +
1
(δq2)T
]
≤ 13. (3.3)
This inequality places a restriction on the exogenous parameters of the game for the
strategy profile above to be an equilibrium. Abreu et al. (1991) used a version of this
bound to argue a result along the following lines.
Proposition 2. For every block length T ∈ N, there exists δ < 1 sufficiently large
that the strategies above constitute an equilibrium. Moreover,
lim
T→∞
lim
δ→1
v = 15.
Note that 15 + 15 > 20. This shows that the public equilibrium bound on payoffs
can be overcome with delay.
3.4.3 Delay with practical cut-offs
AMP equilibria suffer from the following basic problem: as T grows, the demands
placed on δ for an equilibrium become unreasonable. For instance, if T = 20 (or 3
seconds) then (3.3) requires δ to be so unreasonably close to 1 that interpreting it as
the probability of termination would imply an expected duration of a match to be
more than 1,000 years, using the parameters from our experiment.
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Essentially, the construction by Abreu et al.(1991) is too lenient over when players
are punished. It takes T bad signal realizations to trigger punishment. A less lenient,
but more practical, approach to making use of delay is the following one taken from
Rahman (2013b). If T is large then the distribution of signals is close to normally
distributed by the Central Limit Theorem, and the likelihood that in equilibrium
there will be more than 1
2
T bad signals is relatively low, since the expected number
of bad signals is 1
4
T .41 Therefore, punishment actually occurs relatively infrequently
in equilibrium. Nevertheless, it is still the case that discouraging a single deviation
discourages them all, which helps to establish a Folk Theorem.
Specifically, consider the following strategies, called practical cut-off strategies. As
with AMP block strategies in Section 3.4.2, players cooperate over a T -period block
with information delay. If the number of bad signals at the end of the block is greater
than 1
2
T , then players choose mutual defection henceforth with some probability α.
Otherwise, they continue to cooperate in the next block, with the same contingent
plan. The only difference between AMP block strategies and practical cut-off strate-
gies is in the number of bad signals that trigger punishment. In the former, this
number is T , whereas in the latter it is 1
2
T . Nevertheless, Rahman (2013b) shows
that these cut-offs lead to efficient outcomes with reasonable discount rates, in con-
trast with the previous objection to AMP block strategies. This shows that—at least
in theory—it is possible for players to substantially improve on the public equilibrium
benchmark of Proposition 1.
3.4.4 How bounded rationality can help
As noted in the introduction, bounded rationality can also help players overcome the
bound on public equilibrium payoffs. Let τ = 2 denote the number of periods that a
player is unable to change her action, and consider the following strongly symmetric
strategies. Every player cooperates for τ periods. At the end of the τ -period block,
the players consider cooperating if anything other than τ bad signals is observed. If
τ bad signals are observed, the players switch to defection with some probability α.
The probability of 2 consecutive bad signals equals q22 in equilibrium. A player’s
41This cut-off is lower than might be expected from a version of the mechanism proposed by
Kandori and Matsushima (1998) in discrete time, closer to 14T , which would not approximate full
cooperation due to a non-vanishing punishment probability.
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lifetime utility under this strategy profile is therefore given by
v = (1− δ2)15 + δ2[(1− q22)v + q22((1− α)v + 2α)].
Rearranging,
v = 15− δ
2
1− δ2 q
2
2α(v − 2). (3.4)
Discouraging a deviation requires that the utility gained from defecting, (1−δ2)5,
be outweighed by the associated loss in continuation payoff. Thus, the incentive
constraint is
(1− δ2)5 ≤ q22α(q21 − q22)(v − 2). (3.5)
Consider maximizing v with respect to α such that the trigger strategies above
remain an equilibrium. At an optimum, the incentive constraint (3.5) must bind,
since otherwise by (3.4) we would be able to feasibly lower α further and increase v,
contradicting optimality. If (3.5) binds then the maximum value of v equals
v = 15− 5(
q1
q2
)2
− 1
= 15− 5/3 ≈ 13.33 > 10.
It is easy to check that the feasibility constraint, that is, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, is satisfied
given the parameters of the experiment.
3.5 Results
Data was collected from 248 University of Minnesota undergraduate students at the
Anderson Hall Social and Behavioral Sciences Laboratory. Table 13 reports select
summary information.42 To estimate the effect of our treatments on cooperation, we
regressed each subject’s average cooperation rate in non-practice matches43 on three
dummies: Delay (=1 for treatments with delay), Communication (=1 for treatments
with communication) and Slow (=1 for treatment S). The regression was performed
with session-clustered standard errors. The results, presented in the left column of
42Notice that treatments N and D had more matches than treatments NC and DC. This is because
communication took up a significant portion of time in the latter treatments, as discussed in Section
3.3.
43The analysis here is restricted to non-practice matches. We discuss behavior in practice matches
and the dynamics of cooperation below.
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Table 14, show that delay of information led to lower and communication to higher
cooperation rates.
Delay
∆t=0.15 sec. c=15 sec.
Communication
No
Treatment N Treatment D
6 sessions 3 sessions
N = 64 N = 46
287 matches 169 matches
Yes
Treatment NC Treatment DC
3 sessions 3 sessions
N = 44 N = 52
109 matches 83 matches
No delay
No communication
∆t = 1 sec.
Treatment S
4 sessions
N=42
49 matches
Table 13: Summary statistics of the experimental treatments
While other studies found that communication improves cooperation in games,
our result that delay hinders cooperation is entirely new; it is therefore important
to verify its replicability. We found a similar result in a pilot experiment that we
conducted in the summer of 2013 with a sample size of 66 subjects, where under
different parameters delay has a significantly negative effect on welfare (P < 0.05 with
session-clustered errors). This experiment also had frequent actions and imperfect
monitoring, but subjects observed their own stocks of payoffs, rather than the noisy
signal. In one treatment, the payoff stock was observed in real time, and the second
treatment, it was observed with delay. The payoff stock, however, depended on one’s
own chosen action, the chosen action of the opponent, and noise. We highlight our
first result below:
Result 1. Delay of information hinders cooperation.
The effects of the treatment variables on subjects’ average attained payoffs are
shown in the right column of Table 14. It is apparent the effects on welfare exactly
parallel the effects on cooperation rates described above. The average payoff in
treatments N and DC does not differ significantly from 10 (P -values of 0.742 and
0.937, respectively); the average payoff in treatment D is significantly below 10 (P <
0.01), and the average payoff in treatment NC is significantly above 10 (P < 0.01).
This latter result suggests off-equilibrium behavior, private strategies, or equilibrium
behavior with bounded rationality in treatment NC. We highlight this result below:
Result 2. Communication improves cooperation, allowing players
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Cooperation Average payoff
Delay -0.102*** -1.251***
(0.0359) (0.440)
Communication 0.111*** 1.405***
(0.0364) (0.444)
Slow -0.0264 -0.315
(0.0392) (0.463)
Constant 0.558**** 9.882****
(0.0288) (0.353)
Observations 248 248
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 14: Treatment effects on subjects’ average cooperation rates and payoffs.
to exceed the public equilibrium bound on payoffs.
As noted previously, subjects’ inability to change their action in every period
of the treatments with frequent actions raises the question of whether this sort of
bounded rationality has an effect on behavior. That the subjects exceed the bound
on public Nash equilibrium payoffs in treatment NC makes this question all the more
salient. We find, however, that slowing down the experiment has no significant effect
on subjects’ cooperation rates or payoffs (Table 14). In magnitude, the effect of the
Slow dummy on individual cooperation rates is less than 3%, and the attained payoffs
levels are virtually the same. This is our third significant result:
Result 3. Giving players more time to think about their choices has
no effect on behavior.
We also explored the effect of our treatment variables on mutual cooperation rates.
To this end, we created three variables for each of the 697 matches in the dataset:
percentage of time spent in action profile (C,C), percentage of time spent in action
profile (C,D) or (D,C), and percentage of time spent in action profile (D,D,). These
profiles of cooperation rates are plotted for different treatments in Figure 8. In the
bottom part of the figure, we report the results of regressions in which these variables
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No delay With delay No delay With delay
No delay With delay
No communication, Fast No communication, Slow
With communication, Fast
Mutual cooperation
Unilateral cooperation
Mutual defection
(C,C) (C,D) or (D,C) (D,D)
Delay -0.0889** 0.0293 0.0596*
(0.0419) (0.0271) (0.0329)
Communication 0.154*** -0.0488 -0.105***
(0.0491) (0.0309) (0.0280)
Slow 0.0224 -0.0257 0.00331
(0.0527) (0.0323) (0.0242)
Constant 0.327**** 0.434**** 0.239****
(0.0378) (0.0210) (0.0203)
Observations 697 697 697
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Figure 8: Treatment effects on subjects’ mutual cooperation rates.
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are regressed against the treatment dummies. Delay made mutual cooperation less
likely (P < 0.05) and mutual defection more likely (P < 0.1). Communication
had the reverse effect, increasing mutual cooperation (P < 0.01) and decreasing
mutual defection (P < 0.01). Interestingly, neither of these variables had an effect
on unilateral cooperation rates. In the slow treatment, the profile of cooperation did
not significantly differ from that in the baseline treatment (N), providing additional
evidence for Result 3 above.
3.5.1 Dynamics
To study the dynamics of cooperation in the experiment, we changed the unit of
analysis to average cooperation rate per block and re-ran the regression reported
in Table 14 for all blocks and matches, including practice matches. We included
a practice dummy, a block number variable (1 for the first 100 periods, 2 for the
next 100 periods, etc.), and a match number variable. The results of this regression
and an analogous regression in which the dependent variable is the subject’s average
payoff per block are reported in the left-most two columns of Table 15. Subjects
cooperated significantly more often in the practice matches (P < 0.05), but the
match and block dummies failed to reach significance. The average cooperation rate in
practice matches was approximately 65%, while the average in non-practice matches
was approximately 55%.
We also re-ran the regressions reported in Table 14 for the practice matches.
The results of these regressions are shown in the right-most two columns of Table
15. Unlike Table 14, Table 15 shows none of the treatment dummies as significant.
I.e., subjects sustained comparably high cooperation rates and welfare levels in every
treatment of the practice matches. Even in the slow treatment, where average payoffs
above 10 cannot be sustained in public equilibrium with or without response time
constraints,44 we find that the average attained welfare level is significantly higher
than 10 (mean=10.87, P < 0.05, session-robust standard errors). We summarize the
findings described above as follows:
Result 4. There are significant differences in behavior between
practice and paid matches (and evidence of off-equilibrium behavior
44In this treatment, periods proceed at a slow enough rate that subjects can physically respond
in every period.
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All data Practice data
Cooperation Average payoff Cooperation Average payoff
(per block) (per block) (per subject) (per subject)
Delay -0.0861** -2.092** -0.0373 -0.409
(0.0312) (0.777) (0.0538) (0.651)
Communication 0.0936*** 2.302*** 0.0590 0.583
(0.0323) (0.785) (0.0542) (0.655)
Slow -0.0409 -1.021 -0.00979 -0.203
(0.0346) (0.815) (0.0353) (0.443)
Practice 0.0634** 1.554**
(0.0260) (0.661)
Match -0.00548 -0.140
(0.00352) (0.0866)
Block -0.000817 -0.0267
(0.00118) (0.0291)
Constant 0.595**** 20.76**** 0.648**** 11.08****
(0.0300) (0.743) (0.0315) (0.386)
Observations 9674 4837 248 248
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 15: Dynamics of cooperation in the experiment. There was significantly more cooperation in
practice than in paid matches, but little learning once the paid matches start (left column). In the
practice matches, none of the experimental treatments affected cooperation rates (right column).
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in practice matches), but little learning once the paid matches start.
To explore the dynamics of cooperation further, we examined whether what hap-
pens in the very first period of the match explains what happens in the rest of the
match. To this end, we controlled for the subjects’ chosen profile of cooperation in the
regressions reported in Figure 8 by introducing two dummy variables: a mutual co-
operation dummy (=1 if the players chose (C,C) in the first period of the match) and
a unilateral cooperation dummy (=1 if the players chosen (C,D) or (D,C) in the first
period of the match). The results are shown in Table 16. Both of the new variables
have highly significant coefficients. Moreover, the effect of delay loses significance
both when mutual cooperation in the match (P = 0.202) and mutual defection in the
match (P = 0.595) are dependent variables. The effect of communication remains
significant but falls in magnitude, from 15.4% to to 9.13% when the percentage of
match spent in mutual cooperation is the dependent variable, and from -10.5% to
-6.53% when the dependent variable is mutual defection. Thus, first period profiles
of cooperation largely explain the effects of the treatment variables. We highlight
this result below:
Result 5. The effect of delay (communication) on cooperation in
the course on the match is largely (partially) explained by differ-
ences in first period profiles of cooperation.
3.5.2 Strategies
We next looked at how subjects’ behavior depended on the realized public signals. We
averaged actions taken in each period (1-100) across all sessions, matches and blocks,
taking into account the evolution of the public signal in the previous block. The
average cooperation rates following blocks with different numbers of good news are
plotted in Figure 9. This figure makes apparent a number of behavioral regularities.
First, it suggests that subjects cooperate more in blocks that follow blocks with
high realizations of the public signal, and that this is true for treatments with and
without delay. The figure obscures the effect of the public signal, however, because
past realizations of the signal are related to past cooperation rates. We therefore ran
regressions in which a subject’s cooperation rate in block b was regressed against the
public signal at the end of block b− 1, using the partner’s cooperation rate in block
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(C,C) (C,D) or (D,C) (D,D)
Delay -0.0435 0.0281 0.0154
(0.0330) (0.0226) (0.0286)
Communication 0.0913** -0.0260 -0.0653***
(0.0336) (0.0244) (0.0213)
Slow 0.0325 -0.0381 0.00564
(0.0800) (0.0486) (0.0355)
(C,C) in first period 0.414**** 0.0396 -0.453****
(0.0380) (0.0400) (0.0513)
(C,D) or (D,C) in first period 0.0761*** 0.255**** -0.331****
(0.0218) (0.0393) (0.0486)
Constant 0.124*** 0.297**** 0.579****
(0.0377) (0.0356) (0.0488)
Observations 697 697 697
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 16: The action profile chosen by the players in the beginning of the match had a significant
effect on the average action profile in the match. Note that the effect of the delay variable loses
significance when players’ first period choices are controlled for.
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Figure 9: Behavior and the public signal. Each bar in plots average cooperation in rates in periods
1-100 of the block, with period number on the horizontal axis. Colors code the variable z, defined
as the number of good news less the number of bad news received in the previous block.
b− 1 as in instrument. Specifically, the model we estimated was
aib = βzi,b−1 + αi + ib,
where aib is subject i’s average cooperation rate in block b and zi,b−1 is the number
of good news minus the number of bad news observed in the previous block b − 1.
Because ib may be related to ai,b−1, which is strongly correlated with zi,b−1, there is
a potential endogeneity issue. To address it, we used a−i,b−1, the cooperation rate of
i’s partner in block b − 1, as an instrument for zi,b−1. Because i never observes her
partner’s actions except through the public signal, the instrument is valid.
We ran these regressions separately for every treatment, including subject fixed
effects as covariates, and clustering the standard errors by session. The results are
shown in Table 17. Once past cooperation rates are controlled for, we find that
past realizations of the signal have highly significant positive effects on behavior
(P < 0.001) in every treatment without communication, and in the treatment with
communication and no delay. The positive and highly significant relationship between
signals and behavior constitutes our sixth major finding:
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Treatment N D S
Prev. block signals 0.00477**** 0.00530**** 0.00154****
Prev. block signals (0.000631) (0.000590) (0.000388)
Observations 2994 1776 362
Treatment NC DC
0.00316**** 0.00114
(0.000756) (0.00249)
Observations 676 810
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 17: Behavior and signals received in the previous 100-period block. The partner’s cooper-
ation rate in the previous block is used as an instrument for previous block’s final signal position.
The first stage F-statistics in these regressions range from 151.346 to 2389.576.
Result 6. Subjects provide each other with incentives by cooperat-
ing more after receiving good news.
Note that the coefficient on the signal variable is almost two times smaller in mag-
nitude in the treatments with communication. This suggests that when the subjects
are able to communicate, they rely on old signals less, and that the messages have
informational content. To confirm this, we looked at correlations between what the
subjects communicated and how they behaved. For the 96 subjects who participated
in the treatments with communication, the average promised cooperation rate in the
non-practice matches was approximately 63% (promises averaged across blocks for
each subject). The actual cooperation rate, in comparison, was approximately 69%.
The correlation between promised and actual cooperation rates is strong and highly
significant (correlation coefficient of .6214, P < 0.001). We interpret this as strong
evidence that messages in our data relate to behavior:
Result 7. The messages have informational content.
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3.5.3 Periodicity of behavior
Figure 9 also suggests that behavior in treatments without delay has a highly periodic
nature: regardless of the number of good signals observed in the previous block,
subjects in these treatments are more likely to defect in the late periods of each block
than they are in the early ones. This can also be seen in Figure 10, which aggregates
the data for different past realizations of the public signal and plots the per-period
cooperation rates for different treatments. Cooperation in these treatments is periodic
with and without communication (top panel), with no clear time trend across blocks
(bottom panel). Remarkably, cooperation rates in the slow treatment increase at
about the same rate (per period) as they do in the fast treatments without delay,
and then follow a similar gradual decline.
Result 8. Blocks in treatments without delay exhibit a striking
periodicity in behavior.
Note that the slope of the within-block trend is different in treatments with and
without communication. Without communication, cooperation declines at a constant
slope. With communication, it stays at a high level for a longer period of time,
and then declines steeply. This observation sheds light on some of the dynamics
of cooperation described above. Recall that the first period cooperation profile can
explain most of the treatment effect of delay, but that the effect of communication
remains significant even when the first period cooperation profile is controlled for.
That cooperation declines faster without communication provides one avenue for a
within block (and hence within-match) effect of the communication treatment.
One interpretation of this observed periodicity in behavior is that it reflects a focal
point introduced by our design, which divides the match into 100-period blocks. This
focal point may influence subjects to coordinate on mutual cooperation around the
beginning of each block. Intuitively, a break (like a postman knocking on the door
of a couple that is fighting) distracts the subjects, thereby restoring initial levels of
cooperation. However, because behavior is not periodic in treatments with delay, this
explanation is problematic.
An arguably more plausible interpretation is that players observe signals and
choose their level of cooperation on the basis of the progress of the signal. For
instance, suppose that in equilibrium the drift of the signal is fixed at some level while
players are in a cooperative phase. As soon as the Brownian motion passes through a
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Figure 10: Periodicity of behavior. The top panels plot data averaged across all blocks and
matches. In treatments without delay, cooperation rates start out high, decline over time, and
refresh at the beginning of the next 100 period block. The decline in cooperation is faster for
treatments without communication. No periodicity of behavior is observed in the treatments with
delay. Behavior in the slow treatment follows the same pattern as behavior in the treatment with
frequent actions and no communication.
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Figure 11: Illustration of strategies with first passage times determining switches in cooperation
rates. The parameter ` describes the amount of leeway a player gives to the public signal before
switching from a cooperative regime to a more defective regime.
window of some length ` from this drift, players move to a punishment phase for the
rest of the block, and then restart their strategy in the next block, perhaps updating
` on the basis of the length of time it took for the Brownian motion to escape the
previous cutoff in the last period. See Figure 11. Assuming a common threshold `
across matches and subjects, the density f of first passage times would take the form
f(t) =
`√
2pit3
exp
(
−`
2
2t
)
.
Under this model, the rate of cooperation decreases gradually over time, in line
with the experimental results of Figure 10(a) without delay. (The initial increase in
cooperation rates in the fast treatments is likely due to subjects reacting relatively
slowly to adjusting their action from the end of the previous block.) Of course, a
richer model of passage times and cutoff strategies can be used to fit the data precisely
by fitting an appropriate inverse Gaussian distribution to average cooperation rates
and allowing for variation in thresholds `.
3.6 Discussion
Our experiments provide the first systematic treatment of delay, communication, and
reaction lags in a repeated game with frequent actions and imperfect monitoring.
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The results draw attention to several discrepancies with standard theory. The first
finding is that delay unambiguously hurt subjects. This is at odds with the Abreu
et al. (1991) argument that information delay can substantially help players to re-
duce the likelihood of inefficient punishments. The argument is robust—it holds in
games with frequent and infrequent actions, with unbounded patience, even in ap-
proximate equilibrium, which makes the empirical finding all the more puzzling. One
explanation of it is that delay makes it more difficult for subjects to learn the kind
of opponent they are facing. Intuitively, if subjects face too much uncertainty over
their opponents’ planned behavior, then it may be difficult to justify cooperating with
them. The absence of delay may help players to signal their intended behavior more
effectively.
Our second finding is that communication unambiguously helps subjects. Al-
though it is well known in the experimental literature that communication generally
improves welfare in a wide variety of strategic contexts, there is no strong theoretical
justification for it adding (or subtracting) value in our experiment, unless—again—it
helps to reduce subjects’ uncertainty over their opponents’ intentions. This suggests
several sources of possible gains from reducing uncertainty over opponents’ strategies.
First, it may motivate a subject to cooperate more if she is more confident that her
opponent is likely to cooperate in return. Second, it may be easier to give incentives
for cooperation to opponents if they can be made better aware of the consequences
of their defection. In treatments with communication, where subjects announce their
contingent plans at the beginning of every block, both of these channels should be
facilitated—at least somewhat–and we find this to be the case. Subjects use messages
to inform their opponents of future strategies, and reported and actual behaviors are
significantly aligned.
We also find little evidence that reaction lags affect behavior in our experiment.
This is a notable observation in light of the experiments reported in Friedman and
Oprea (2012), where cooperation rates increase monotonically as players are given
the opportunity to respond more quickly. Friedman and Oprea (2012) argued that
response lags prevent players from quickly punishing deviations and that the gains to
shorter lags are monotonic. Crucially, this argument only makes sense with perfect
monitoring. In an environment like ours where information is noisy, reaction lags may
allow players to gain a better idea of whether their partners are being cooperative,
thereby supporting more efficient equilibria. We find, however, that cooperation does
not seem to be affected in practice by how much time a player has to respond to a
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signal.
Our instrumental variable-based estimation shows that subjects behavior is driven
by observations of the public signal. Using an opponent’s strategic behavior as an
instrument is justified by the assumption that subjects play mixed strategies. As
a result, conditional on the public signal, random changes in a subject’s behavior
must be mutually independent. Since the coefficient on the public signal is estimated
with an instrument, it is unbiased regardless of other omitted variables. If there
are no omitted variables then the regression equation is consistent with a first-order
approximation of public strategies. Of course, if we assume that subjects’ behavior
is consistent with equilibrium then players must be playing public equilibria. From
a practical point of view, public equilibrium makes testable restrictions on feasible
outcomes, such as the welfare bound of Proposition 1. However, our treatment with
communication implies that the public equilibrium bound is violated. This could be
for several reasons. First, it could be that subjects simply do not play equilibrium
strategies. However, if the equilibrium assumption is dropped then it is not clear
what structural predictions can be made. Secondly, it could be that their bounded
rationality means that they are incapable of playing public equilibria, as they cannot
react immediately to an individual bad news event. This may improve welfare, as
illustrated in Section 3.4.4. However, it is not clear why players would exploit this
bounded rationality in treatments with communication in order to exceed the pub-
lic equilibrium bound but not in those without. Thirdly, subjects may be playing
private—not public—strategies. From a technical point of view, public equilibrium is
an assumption that often puts severe restrictions on behavior. That is, it precludes
players from certain behavior that may be intuitively justified in some contexts.
Rahman (2012, 2013a) explores this issue at some length and argues that public
equilibria preclude secret monitoring and infrequent coordination amongst players.
Both of these behaviors have the potential to improve their welfare significantly, so
much so that the impossibility results of Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007, 2010) can
be completely overturned. Our interest in future work is to explore experimentally
how infrequent coordination can help sustain cooperation in the laboratory.
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4 Appendix
4.1 Questions for Second Movers
While first movers were answering F1-F3, second movers answered S1-S4.
S1. What will the first mover do?
Possible answers: In for sure, 90/10 In/Out, 80/20 In/Out, ..., Out for sure.
S2. If the first mover goes in, what will he/she think about the move you will make in
the second stage?
Possible answers: Left for sure, 90/10 Left/Right, 80/20 Left/Right, ..., Right for sure.
S3. If the first mover goes in, what will he/she do next?
Possible answers: Top for sure, 90/10 Top/Bottom, 80/20 Top/Bottom, ..., Bottom
for sure.
After the choice of the first mover was observed, all second movers answered S4.
S4. The first mover thought that if the second mover is given a chance to move, the
second mover will pick:
Possible answers: Left for sure, 90/10 Left/Right, 80/20 Left/Right, ..., Right for sure.
The remaining questions of second movers depended on whether their partner chose
Out or In. The choice of Out prompted S5-S7.
S5. Why did the first mover think this? (This question followed S4.)
S6. If you were given a chance to move, you would choose:
Possible answers: Left for sure, 90/10 Left/Right, 80/20 Left/Right, ..., Right for sure.
S7. Why would you make this move?
If the first mover chose In, the second mover answered S8-S10.
S8. For his/her next move, the first mover will choose:
Possible answers: Top for sure, 90/10 Top/Bottom, 80/20 Top/Bottom, ..., Bottom
for sure.
S9. Why will the first mover make this choice?
S10. Why did you make this move? (This question followed the second mover’s choice
between Left and Right.)
Welcome to this decision making experiment. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
You will be quizzed on these instructions, and you will not be able to continue the experiment until you complete the 
quiz. Please read the instructions carefully, and raise your hand if you have any questions.  
In this experiment, you will play a game a number of times. The whole experiment (including reading the instructions) 
should take no longer than 1 hour.  
In this game, there is a first mover and a second mover. Depending on what the first mover does, one round of this 
game can have 1 or 2 stages.  
ONE ROUND 
 
STAGE 1 (happens always) 
 
In this stage, the first mover will decide whether to choose Out or In.  
 
 If the first mover chooses Out, both players will get $7. The second mover will be informed that the first mover 
went Out, and the round will end.  
 If the first mover chooses In, the game will proceed to the next stage. 
 
 
STAGE 2 (happens only in the first mover chooses In) 
 
In this stage, the second mover will be informed that the first mover went In, and both players will make additional 
choices. The first mover will choose between Top and Bottom and the second mover will choose between Left and Right.  
 
 If the first mover chooses Top, and the second mover chooses Left, the first mover will get $10 and the second 
mover will get $5. 
 If the first mover chooses Top, and the second mover chooses Right, both players will get $0. 
 If the first mover chooses Bottom, and the second mover chooses Left, both players will get $0. 
 If the first mover chooses Bottom, and the second mover chooses Right, the first mover will gets $5 and the 
second mover gets $10. 
 After both players make their choices, the round will end. 
 
IMPORTANT: Neither player will be informed of what the other person did in Stage 2. Therefore, the first mover will 
not find out what the second mover did in Stage 2, and the second mover will not find out what the first mover did in 
Stage 2.  
 
 After the round ends, a new round starts.  
 
 
 
 
Go on to the next page for more instructions 
4.2 Instructions
YOUR ROLE IN THE GAME 
Half of the participants will start out as first movers, and half will start out as second movers. Your role will switch 
throughout the experiment. Therefore, if you start out as the first mover, your roles will be: first mover (round 1), 
second mover (round 2), first mover (round 3), second mover (round 4), etc.   
You will never know the identity of the person you are playing with. 
HOW YOU ARE MATCHED WITH OTHER PEOPLE 
In each round, you will be randomly matched with another player. Because the matching is random, it is very unlikely 
that you will be matched with the same person twice in a row.  
OTHER TASKS YOU HAVE TO COMPLETE 
We will ask you questions about your thoughts regarding the game. Some of the answers are “multiple choice,” and 
some are “short answer” (you have to type). 
You will type the “short answers” in the blue box. PRESS THE ENTER KEY WHEN YOU ARE DONE TYPING. Otherwise, 
your answer will not save.  If you want to type more after you hit ENTER, type in the blue box again, and press the ENTER 
key again.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Go on to the next page for information on how 
you get paid 
 
 HOW YOU GET PAID 
1. You will be paid for your choices in the games. You will get this money immediately at the end of the 
experiment. 
We will randomly select 2 rounds of the game you played. If you got X dollars in the first round and Y dollars in the 
second round, we will pay you X+Y dollars for the games.  
2. You will later be paid for your answers to the questions we ask.  
You will see questions, in which you will be 
 guessing  the other player’s behavior,  
 guessing the other player’s thoughts, 
 explaining the other person’s behavior or thoughts.   
When we analyze your answers to these questions, we will score them against the response of the other player. It is 
always in your best interests to answer them as truthfully as possible. The closer your answer is to the truth (which we 
get from the other player), the more money you make. Within 3 weeks from today, we will mail you a check for your 
guesses and explanations. 
We will not pay you additional money for answers to questions about your own thoughts and behavior, but obtaining 
your considered opinion is important for our study, so please be as detailed as possible in your answers. 
The following page of the instructions describes the details of how payments for your answers are calculated. You will 
not be quizzed on this information, but skim it if you need to be convinced that answering these questions truthfully is in 
your best interests.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 DETAILS: Payments for short answers 
For each question in which you explain what the other player is doing (or thinking), this player will have a corresponding 
question in which they have to explain their own behavior (or thoughts). We will evaluate your answer by placing it into 
one of several categories, and do the same for the answer the other player provides. If the categories match, we will pay 
you $1. For example, if your explanation of why the other player will behave in a particular way matches that player's 
explanation of their behavior, you get $1.  If your explanations do not match, we will pay you $0. If one of you does not 
provide a short answer, we will pay you $0.  
DETAILS: Payments for multiple choice questions 
When you are making a guess about the other player’s behavior, the amount you are paid will be calculated as in the 
example below. 
Example: The other person chooses between Move A and Move B, and you guess what move they will make.  Your 
possible guesses – the odds of the other player making one choice or the other – are in the leftmost column of the table 
below. Your payments, which depend on the other player’s choice, are in the other two columns. The closer your guess 
is to their choice, the more money you make.  
 Other person chooses Move A Other person chooses Move B 
You guess "Move A for sure"  100 cents 0 
You guess "90/10 Move A/Move B" 99 cents 19 cents 
You guess "80/20 Move A/Move B" 96 cents 36 cents 
You guess "70/30 Move A/Move B" 91 cents 51 cents 
You guess "60/40 Move A/Move B" 84 cents 64 cents 
You guess "50/50 Move A/Move B" 75 cents 75 cents 
You guess "40/60 Move A/Move B" 64 cents 84 cents 
You guess "30/70 Move A/Move B" 51 cents 91 cents 
You guess "20/80 Move A/Move B 36 cents 96 cents 
You guess "10/90 Move A/Move B" 19 cents 99 cents 
You guess "Move B for sure" 0 cents 100 cents 
 
When you are making a guess about the other player’s thoughts, the answers you and the other player provide will be 
probabilities, and your payment will be calculated as         , where   is the probability you reported, and   is the 
probability reported by the other player. The closer your report is to the report of the other player, the more money 
you make.  
We will pay you for your multiple choice answers whenever possible. Some of these questions you will answer will be of 
the form ``if something, then [your multiple choice guess]." Whenever this `` something" is not realized, we will not be 
able to score your answers.  But we might still use them when we are analyzing your written explanations! It is always in 
your best interests to answer multiple choice questions truthfully. 
If you guess about the same item more than once in the course of one round, and both answers are scored, then we will 
pay you for your best guess. 
4.3 Quiz questions for participants
• You are the first mover, and you go Out. How much does the second mover get? (a)
$0; (b) $7; (c) $5; (d) $10.
• You are the second mover. The first mover went In and chose Bottom for their next
move. How much do you get? (a) $0; (b) $7; (c) If I go Left, I get $0. If I go Right,
I get $10; (d) $5.
• In this game, the first mover will be informed of: (a) (If he/she goes In) Whether
the second mover chose Left or Right; (b) (If he/she goes In) How much money both
players made; (c) The first mover will not be informed of anything that happens after
he/she goes In; (d) None of the above is true.
• In this game, the second mover will be informed of: (a) (If the first mover went In)
Whether the first mover chooses Top or Bottom next; (b) Whether the first mover
went In or Out; (c) The second mover will not be informed of anything that happens
in this game; (d) None of the above is true.
4.4 Summary of the Data
There was substantial variation in self-reported personality traits. Although we found sig-
nificant correlations between all traits in the Big Five (Table 18), the signs were consistent
with what has been reported in the literature (Anderson et al., 2011).45 Cronbach’s alphas,
which provide a reliability measure for how good a set of questions is at capturing a partic-
ular trait, are high in our data, ranging from 0.85 for Neuroticism to 0.9 for Extraversion.
Figure 12a shows how the amount of correctly adjusted sliders evolved over time. The
workers moved close to seven sliders on average, but there was substantial learning, espe-
cially in the early portion of the experiment. This was confirmed by an OLS regression of
the number of sliders moved in the course of the match against a half dummy (P < 0.001;
see Figure 12d). Figure 12b shows the dynamics of managers’ recommendations, which on
average were not better than chance. An OLS regression of the number of good recommen-
dations against a half dummy showed that the recommendations were significantly worse
in the second half of the experiment (P < 0.001). The average probability of discovering
a prize over time is plotted in Figure 12c. The teams did substantially worse in the first
period after teams were re-matched. Likely, this was the case because the prize was behind
45It is well-known that personality traits are correlated, although the reasons for such correlations
are unclear. Evidence of “meta-traits” has been documented (Rushton and Irwing, 2008), but the
topic remains controversial (Ashton et al., 2009).
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No. of sliders moved No. of good recommendations No. of prizes discovered
Half 17.78**** -0.797** 0.131
(1.815) (0.266) (0.219)
Constant 72.52**** 8.245**** 4.001****
(4.916) (0.440) (0.428)
Observations 156 156 156
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Figure 12: Sliders moved (a), good recommendations made (b), and prizes discovered
(c) over time. Regressions of these variables against a half dummy show that subjects
moved more sliders in the second half of the experiment, that managers made worse
recommendations in the second half, and that the amount of prizes discovered did
not significantly differ across halves (d).
N A C E O
N 1.0000
A -0.1671 1.0000
C -0.3362 0.2797 1.0000
E -0.3063 0.2582 0.4174 1.0000
O -0.2970 0.4037 0.2386 0.4280 1.0000
Table 18: Correlations between self-reported personality traits.
a bottom slider in this period: Starting out by moving top sliders was more natural for the
workers. There was, however, no significant half effect on the number of prizes discovered
(P = 0.5654). On average, the probability of discovering the prize in any period of the
interaction was 0.26. Thus, over the course of 15 periods, close to four prizes were accu-
mulated, leaving the manager with approximately $16 to divide between herself and the
worker.
0
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Worker, no prize Worker, prize
Manager, no prize Manager, prize
Figure 13: Money that the manager allocated to the worker and herself, as a function
of whether or not a prize was discovered. Period number is on the horizontal axis.
Contrary to the non-cooperative prediction, managers did not appropriate the entire
accumulated earnings in the last period. Figure 13 plots the amounts of money that the
manager allocated to herself and her worker in every period, as a function of whether or
not a prize was discovered. Both parties made more money when a prize was discovered
than when it wasn’t. In the latter case, the amounts allocated to the worker were positive
but small, and the manager’s earnings negative due to the 40 cent continuation fee. The
figures suggest that amounts allocated per period did not change over time.
Beauty and gender
There is a considerable literature on the relationship between personality and gender, in
which it has been reported, e.g., in a review by Bouchard and Loehlin (2001), that women
score higher in agreeableness (and neuroticism) than men. Although we don’t know of any
research linking agreeableness to beauty, there is evidence of a relationship between facial
symmetry and self-reported extraversion (Pound et al., 2007). Thus, a link between beauty
and personality cannot be ruled out. On the other hand, earnings gaps due to gender and
beauty are well-established, raising the possibility of agreeableness being correlated with
the error in our regressions.
To address these concerns, we photographed participants in eight of the ten sessions we
ran at the end of the experiment.46 This allowed us to control for their gender as well as
beauty in this subsample. We hired 20 University of Minnesota undergraduates to rate the
photos for a flat fee of $10. The same subject pool was used, but students who participated
in the original experiment were not allowed to sign up for the photo evaluation component.
All raters were presented with the entire set of photographs (order randomized) and told
to rate each photo on a scale of 1-5, borrowed from Biddle and Hamermesh (1998).47 We
followed the procedure described in Mobius and Rosenblat (2006) to create our beauty
regressor: rater j ’s centered beauty rating r˜ji of subject i was obtained by subtracting the
rater’s average beauty rating r¯j from each raw rating rji, and the variable Beautyi defined
as the mean over j of r˜ji.
4.5 Additional Robustness Checks
46We were not able to obtain the photographs in the first two sessions due to unforeseen time
constraints. These sessions, however, did not differ from the following eight in any other regard.
In particular, participants in every session signed an identical consent form, which allowed for the
possibility of being photographed.
475 - strikingly handsome or beautiful, 2 - above average attractiveness, 3 - average, 2 - plain,
below average in attractiveness, 1 - homely, far below average in attractiveness. As in Biddle
and Hamermesh (1998), subjects were told to “imagine how the person would look under ordinary
circumstances” if they saw an “unflattering facial expression.”
Additional controls Personality of worker Personality of manager Sessions N
None p = 0.1543 p = 0.2137 10 156
Output p = 0.0630 p = 0.6499 10 156
Physical traits p = 0.0054 p = 0.6014 8 123
Output and physical traits p = 0.0031 p = 0.6393 8 123
Additional controls Personality of worker Personality of manager Sessions N
None p = 0.0217 p = 0.1814 10 156
Physical traits p = 0.0040 p = 0.2792 8 123
Table 19: Correlations between personality and the worker’s effort. Session and
half fixed effects are included. The personality traits of the worker remain jointly
significant in all but one specification.
Income Inequality Income Inequality
Agreeableness -1.304 -2.260*** -1.186** -2.387**
(1.098) (0.858) (0.566) (1.197)
Output 1.322*** -1.430
(0.461) (0.940)
F-statistic (first stage, agreeableness) 24.04 24.04 23.52 23.52
F-statistic (first stage, output) 14.06 14.06
F-statistic (second stage) 1.177 5.791 4.901 2.869
Underidentification test 0.0217 0.0217 0.0240 0.0240
Observations 154 154 154 154
Session-clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 20: The effect of the worker’s agreeableness on her bargaining power, with
the worker’s rating of the (other) manager used as an instrument. Session half fixed
effects are included.
In this game, there is a team with Person B and Person A.  The role of Person B is  
1. to give recommendations to Person A, and  
2. to decide how prize money (described below) should be distributed between the team members.  
The game will last 15 periods OR until Person B runs out of money.  
In the first period of the game, there is no recommendation. When the game starts (Period 1 out of 15), Person B will 
see a screen like this 
 
and Person A will see a screen like this 
 
4.6 Instructions
Person A will see 24 sliders on their screen. He/she has 40 seconds to adjust the sliders.  
TOP sliders are sliders in the first four rows. BOTTOM sliders are sliders in the last four rows. 
Therefore, Person A will have 12 TOP sliders, and 12 BOTTOM sliders.  
Adjusting a slider correctly means adjusting it to position 50. For example, in the screen grab below, one slider in the 
first row has been adjusted to position 50 (correct, TOP), one slider in the second row has been adjusted to position 50 
(correct, TOP), one slider in the sixth row has been adjusted to position 35 (incorrect, BOTTOM), and one slider in the 
eighth row has been adjusted to position 50 (correct, BOTTOM).  
 
Notice that a message in the top part of the screen is informing Person A that two TOP sliders have been adjusted 
correctly (in the first and second rows) and one BOTTOM slider has been adjusted correctly (the one in the eighth row). 
The only other slider that has been adjusted – the one in the sixth row – has not been adjusted correctly.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How money is earned 
If you are Person A, you earn one penny for each slider NOT at position 50. This money is yours to keep; Person B 
cannot take it away.  
Therefore, in the example above, where three sliders are at 50, Person A will get 21 cents if they keep all sliders at their 
current positions. 
Why would Person A want to adjust sliders at all? One and only one of the 24 sliders contains a prize.  
BUT YOU DON’T GET THE PRIZE MONEY AUTOMATICALLY.  Aside from the pennies Person A gets for unadjusted sliders, 
Person B is completely in control of the payments received by Person A.    
 
Where is the prize? 
The prize can either be behind a TOP or a BOTTOM slider. 
Whether the prize is behind a TOP/BOTTOM slider in the next round only depends on where the prize was in this round.  
Person A will never know where the prize is.  At the end of every round, Person B will see whether or not the prize was 
discovered. He/she will use this information to make recommendations to Person A.  
 
After the 40 seconds given to Person A to adjust their sliders run out, Person A will see a screen like this 
 
 
and Person B will see a screen like this
 
Now, Person B has to decide how much he/she wants to pay Person A. Person B has unlimited time to make this 
decision.  
In the beginning of the experiment, Person B starts out with 500 cents. 
40 cents are subtracted from Person B’s earnings at the beginning of every 
period.  
Therefore, as soon as Period 1 starts, 40 cents are subtracted from 500, leaving person B with 460. 
If a prize is discovered, Person B gets 400 cents added to their total funds.  
Therefore, you are Person B, and Person A discovered the prize, your available funds (or “Cash at your disposal”) at the 
end of Period 1 will be 860. You will see this number in of the rectangle (         ) in the screen grab above.  
In place of the triangle (       ), you will see the word “YES” or “NO.” YES means that Person A discovered the prize. NO 
means that Person A did not discover the prize. 
Behind the stars (      ) you will find information about how many TOP and BOTTOM sliders Person A adjusted.  
Person B has to decide how much to pay or fine Person A. This number is entered behind the moon symbol (      ). 
Behind the circle (     ) is information about how much Person B paid Person A so far. Whatever is entered behind the 
moon gets added to the number behind the circle.  
 Paying (or fining) Person A 
 
There are a couple of restrictions on how Person B can pay (fine) Person A.  
 
 
 
1. Person B has to make sure that they don’t go over the cash at their disposal. Therefore, if Person B has 
1700 cents available, they have to pay Person A no more than 1700. 
 
2. Person B cannot take more money from Person A than what Person A has been paid so far.  
 
In other words, whatever is entered here with a minus sign cannot exceed the number here  
 
 
 
 
 
 After Person B decides how to pay Person A, if and only if he/she is left with more than 40, Person B will see a screen 
like this 
 
 
At this point, Person B has to make a recommendation to Person A about which sliders to move.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If Person B has been left with less than 40 after paying Person A, his/her screen will look like this: 
 
 
Pressing OK at this point finishes the experiment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assuming Person B has been left with more than 40 and the experiment continues, both team members will see their 
earnings displayed on the screen.  
Next, Person A will again see their sliders, and Person B will have to wait 40 seconds before paying Person A and making 
the next recommendation.   
 
Communication 
At the end of Periods 5 and 10, instead of continuing to the next round, all team members will see the following on their 
screen. 
 
At this point, Person A and Person B will have three minutes to discuss the game.  
 
The purpose of these discussions is for Person B to understand how he/she wants to adjust the way he/she has been 
paying each Person A.  
You can discuss anything related to the game at this time. As Person B, you share your thoughts and concerns about 
what Person A is doing. As Person A, you can share your thoughts and concerns about what Person B is doing.  
You can discuss anything related to the game.  
 
After the three minutes expire, the experiment will resume.  
 
 
 
  
Payment 
You will be paid privately. 
Person B will not see how much Person A made. (Although, if he/she keeps count of sliders moved and payments 
received in the course of the experiment, he/she could calculate this information.)  
Person A will not know how much money Person B earned.  
 
Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not describe you.  For example, do you 
agree that you seldom feel blue?  Please fill in the number that best indicates the extent to which 
you agree or disagree with each statement listed below.  Be as honest as possible, but rely on 
your initial feeling and do not think too much about each item. 
 
Use the following scale: 
 
 1 - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - 4 - - - - - - - - 5 
      Strongly                            Neither Agree                          Strongly 
      Disagree                            Nor Disagree                             Agree    
 
 
1. ___ Seldom feel blue. 
2. ___ Am not interested in other people's problems. 
3. ___ Carry out my plans. 
4. ___ Make friends easily. 
5. ___ Am quick to understand things. 
6. ___ Get angry easily. 
7. ___ Respect authority. 
8. ___ Leave my belongings around. 
9. ___ Take charge. 
10. ___ Enjoy the beauty of nature. 
11. ___ Am filled with doubts about things. 
12. ___ Feel others' emotions. 
13. ___ Waste my time. 
14. ___ Am hard to get to know. 
15. ___ Have difficulty understanding abstract ideas. 
16. ___ Rarely get irritated. 
17. ___ Believe that I am better than others. 
18. ___ Like order. 
19. ___ Have a strong personality. 
20. ___ Believe in the importance of art. 
21. ___ Feel comfortable with myself. 
22. ___ Inquire about others' well-being. 
23. ___ Find it difficult to get down to work. 
24. ___ Keep others at a distance. 
25. ___ Can handle a lot of information. 
26. ___ Get upset easily. 
27. ___ Hate to seem pushy. 
28. ___ Keep things tidy. 
29. ___ Lack the talent for influencing people. 
30. ___ Love to reflect on things. 
31. ___ Feel threatened easily. 
32. ___ Can't be bothered with other's needs. 
33. ___ Mess things up. 
34. ___ Reveal little about myself. 
35. ___ Like to solve complex problems. 
36. ___ Keep my emotions under control. 
37. ___ Take advantage of others. 
38. ___ Follow a schedule. 
39. ___ Know how to captivate people. 
40. ___ Get deeply immersed in music. 
41. ___ Rarely feel depressed. 
42. ___ Sympathize with others' feelings. 
43. ___ Finish what I start. 
44. ___ Warm up quickly to others. 
45. ___ Avoid philosophical discussions. 
46. ___ Change my mood a lot. 
47. ___ Avoid imposing my will on others. 
48. ___ Am not bothered by messy people. 
49. ___ Wait for others to lead the way. 
50. ___ Do not like poetry. 
51. ___ Worry about things. 
52. ___ Am indifferent to the feelings of others. 
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53. ___ Don't put my mind on the task at hand. 
54. ___ Rarely get caught up in the excitement. 
55. ___ Avoid difficult reading material. 
56. ___ Rarely lose my composure. 
57. ___ Rarely put people under pressure. 
58. ___ Want everything to be “just right.” 
59. ___ See myself as a good leader. 
60. ___ Seldom notice the emotional aspects of  
             paintings and pictures. 
61. ___ Am easily discouraged. 
62. ___ Take no time for others. 
63. ___ Get things done quickly. 
64. ___ Am not a very enthusiastic person. 
65. ___ Have a rich vocabulary. 
66. ___ Am a person whose moods go up and down easily. 
67. ___ Insult people. 
68. ___ Am not bothered by disorder. 
69. ___ Can talk others into doing things. 
70. ___ Need a creative outlet. 
71. ___ Am not embarrassed easily. 
72. ___ Take an interest in other people's lives. 
73. ___ Always know what I am doing. 
74. ___ Show my feelings when I'm happy. 
75. ___ Think quickly. 
76. ___ Am not easily annoyed. 
 
77. ___ Seek conflict. 
78. ___ Dislike routine. 
79. ___ Hold back my opinions. 
80. ___ Seldom get lost in thought. 
81. ___ Become overwhelmed by events. 
82. ___ Don't have a soft side. 
83. ___ Postpone decisions. 
84. ___ Have a lot of fun. 
85. ___ Learn things slowly. 
86. ___ Get easily agitated. 
87. ___ Love a good fight. 
88. ___ See that rules are observed. 
89. ___ Am the first to act. 
90. ___ Seldom daydream. 
91. ___ Am afraid of many things. 
92. ___ Like to do things for others. 
93. ___ Am easily distracted. 
94. ___ Laugh a lot. 
95. ___ Formulate ideas clearly. 
96. ___ Can be stirred up easily. 
97. ___ Am out for my own personal gain. 
98. ___ Want every detail taken care of. 
99. ___ Do not have an assertive personality. 
100. ___ See beauty in things that others  
               might not notice.
 
 
Use the following scale: 
 
 1 - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - 4 - - - - - - - - 5 
      Strongly                            Neither Agree                          Strongly 
      Disagree                            Nor Disagree                             Agree    
BFAS Scoring Key: 
 
Neuroticism 
Withdrawal: 1R, 11, 21R, 31, 41R, 51, 61, 71R, 81, 91 
Volatility: 6, 16R, 26, 36R, 46, 56R, 66, 76R, 86, 96 
 
Agreeableness 
Compassion: 2R,12, 22, 32R, 42, 52R, 62R, 72, 82R, 92 
Politeness: 7, 17R, 27, 37R, 47, 57, 67R, 77R, 87R, 97R 
 
Conscientiousness 
Industriousness: 3, 13R, 23R, 33R, 43, 53R, 63, 73, 83R, 93R 
Orderliness: 8R, 18, 28, 38, 48R, 58, 68R, 78R, 88, 98 
 
Extraversion 
Enthusiasm: 4, 14R, 24R, 34R, 44, 54R, 64R, 74, 84, 94 
Assertiveness: 9, 19, 29R, 39, 49R, 59, 69, 79R, 89, 99R 
 
Openness/Intellect 
Intellect: 5, 15R, 25, 35, 45R, 55R, 65, 75, 85R, 95 
Openness: 10, 20, 30, 40, 50R, 60R, 70, 80R, 90R, 100 
 
Reverse response scores for items followed by “R” (i.e. 1=5, 2=4, 4=2, 5=1).  To compute scale 
scores, average completed items within each scale.  To compute Big Five scores, average scores 
for the two aspects within each domain. 
 
 
Reference:  
DeYoung, C. G., Quilty, L. C., & Peterson, J. B. (2007). Between facets and domains: 10 
Aspects of the Big Five. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 880-896. 
 
Contact Colin DeYoung (cdeyoung@umn.edu) for additional information. 
 
4.8 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof follows a basic argument by Fudenberg et al. (1994).
For a contradiction, assume that γ > 20. Choose v ∈ E(δ) such that v1 + v2 = γ. Player
i’s utility is given by
vi = (1− δ)ui + δ(pw+i + qw−i ),
where w+i and w
−
i denote the continuation payoffs of player i after a good and a bad
signal, respectively, ui is player i’s expected utility today and p and q are, respectively, the
probabilities of a good and a bad signal today. Since γ > 20, it must be the case that
the probability of both players cooperating is greater than zero after some history. Let µj ,
where j 6= i, denote player j’s probability of defection. It will be incentive compatible for
player i to cooperate if
(1− δ)(1− µj)15 + δ
[(
(1− µj)p2 + µjp1)
)
w+i +
(
(1− µj)q2 + µjq1)
)
w−i
]
≥
(1− δ)((1− µj)20 + 2µj)+ δ[((1− µj)p1 + µjp0))w+i + ((1− µj)q1 + µjq0))w−i ].
Write ∆p = (1− µj)(p2 − p1) + µj(p1 − p0). Rearranging yields:
(1− δ)[5(1− µj) + 2µj ] ≤ δ∆p(w+i − w−i ),
that is, current utility gains from deviating are outweighed future losses in continuation
payoffs. Since p2 − p1 = 1/4 and p1 = p0, this inequality yields the following upper bound
on w−i :
w−i ≤ w+i −
1− δ
δ
5(1− µj) + 2µj
∆p
= w+i −
1− δ
δ
5(1− µj) + 2µj
(1− µj)/4 ≤ w
+
i − 20
1− δ
δ
Substituting into the previous expression for vi,
vi ≤ (1− δ)ui + δ
[
w+i − 20q
1− δ
δ
]
.
Therefore,
v1 + v2 ≤ (1− δ) [30− 40q] + δγ.
Since q ≥ 0.25 and v1 + v2 = γ by hypothesis, it follows that γ ≤ 20, as claimed.
Finally, a proof that the bound remains in public communication equilibrium can be
found in Rahman (2013a, Lemma 1). 
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume that (3.2) holds. If a player chooses to deviate for τ
periods, the utility gained from such a deviation is clearly bounded above by (1 − δ)5τ ,
since this bound ignores discounting of future deviation gains. In other words, deviation
gains are linear in the number of deviations. On the other hand, punishment costs grow
exponentially in the number of deviations. Indeed, the opportunity cost of punishment
remains δTα(v − 2), but the change in punishment probability from τ deviations becomes
qT−τ2 (q
τ
1 − qτ2 ) = qT2
[(
q1
q2
)τ
− 1
]
,
which, since q1 > q2, clearly grows exponentially with τ . Now, by the Binomial Theorem,
(q1/q2)
τ −1 ≥ τ [(q1/q2)−1] = τ , so the change in punishment probability is bounded below
by qT2 τ . Therefore, the following inequality implies that τ deviations are discouraged:
(1− δ)5τ ≤ δT qT2 τα(v − 2).
But this is just (3.2). The claim now follows because τ was arbitrary. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Fix T ∈ N. As δ → 1, the left-hand side of (3.3) tends
to 1/T by l’Hopital’s rule, which is less than or equal to 1. Hence, there exists δ < 1
sufficiently large that (3.3) holds, so the candidate equilibrium strategies above are indeed
an equilibrium. Finally, by l’Hopital’s rule, it follows that
v → 15− 5 1
T
as δ → 1.
Finally, it is now clear that v → 15 as T →∞, as claimed. 
Instructions 
 
Welcome and thank you for participating in the following experiment on strategic 
decision-making. This document explains what the experiment will entail. First, notice 
that your show-up fee that is paid separately and is not affected in any way by the 
outcome of the experiment. 
Timing and Payoffs 
 
You will be randomly and anonymously matched to another subject several times. Each 
time you are matched to a subject will be called a “match.” During each match, you will 
interact with the other subject to whom you are matched through a computer program as 
described below. You will have the opportunity to earn money depending on the 
decisions made by you and this other subject.  
 
In the beginning of a match, you will see on the bottom of your computer screen an 
orange button and a purple button. At any time, you will have the choice of selecting 
either color by clicking on the corresponding button with the computer’s cursor, using 
your mouse. The image below shows what your computer screen will look like before 
you make your first choice. 
 
 
 
 
 
Initial screen prior to making first choice 
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Once you and the other subject have selected an initial color, periods will start elapsing 
with a duration of 0.15 seconds per period. You can change your selection at any time 
and as often as you want by selecting the corresponding button; so can the other subject 
to whom you are matched. The computer program will register your changes every 
period. Thus, in 15 seconds the program will register one hundred choices. Unless and 
until you change your choice, your assumed choice for a given period will be the last 
choice you made. For example, if you select orange by clicking on the orange rectangle 
on the screen with your mouse and then change to purple 5 seconds later by clicking on 
the purple rectangle with your mouse then the computer will register that you chose 
orange during the time between clicking orange and purple. 
 
Your monetary payoff at the end of the experiment depends both on your color choices 
and those of the other subjects to whom you were matched. Every period, if you chose 
orange and the other subject chose orange, too, then you will each earn 15 points. If you 
chose orange and the other subject chose purple then you will earn zero points and the 
other subject will earn 20 points. If you chose purple and the other subject chose orange 
then you will earn 20 points and the other subject will earn zero points. Finally, if both 
you and the other subject chose purple then you will each earn 2 points. Your final payoff 
is the accumulation of all your points in all your matches. Points will be exchanged for 
money at the rate of forty (40) points per cent, or 1000 points per 25 cents. The table 
below summarizes this information. 
 
  Other’s choice 
  Orange Purple 
Your choice 
Orange  15 points for you 
15 points for other 
0 points for you 
20 points for other 
Purple 20 points for you 
0 points for other 
2 points for you 
2 points for other 
 
Average points per period depending on each subject’s choices 
 
To illustrate, consider the following example. If you and the other subject to whom you 
are matched both chose orange for 100 periods, then you would earn 15 x 100 = 1,500 
points, translating into 1,500 x 1/40 = 37.5 cents. If you chose purple and the other 
subject chose orange in every period, you would earn a total of 20 x 100 = 2,000 points, 
which would translate into 2,000 x 1/40 = 50 cents. If you both chose purple, then you 
would earn 2 x 100 = 200 points, translating into 200 x 1/40 = 5 cents.  
 
The number of periods in a match is selected as follows. Every period, a random process 
determines whether the match continues on to the next period. The continuation 
probability is held constant, so that the average duration of a match is 700 periods. 
Because termination is random, some matches will last longer than 700 periods and 
others will last less than that. As soon as a match ends, every subject will be randomly 
and anonymously re-matched with another subject. You will be re-matched several times. 
Your final payoff will consist of the accumulation of your payoffs across all matches.  
Information 
 
Throughout a match, you will observe neither your payoff, nor the other subject’s payoff, 
nor the other subject’s choices. Similarly, the other subject will observe neither his or her 
payoff, nor your payoff, nor your choices. You and the other subject will observe the 
outcome of a random signal process, graphically depicted on the left-hand side of your 
computer screen. The graph of the process will depend on your color selection, the other 
subject’s selection, and an element of randomness, as follows.  
 
Every period, the value of the signal process will either increase or decrease by one unit. 
If you and the other subject both chose orange, the value of the process will increase with 
75% probability and decrease with 25% probability. Otherwise, if one or both of you 
chose purple then the process will increase and decrease with 50% probability. 
 
The process will be displayed in real time, in blocks of 100 periods. On the top-right 
region of the screen there will be displayed the fraction of periods during which you 
chose orange in the current block as well as the position of the process, defined as the 
number of time it actually increased minus the number of times it actually decreased in 
the current block. If you and the other subject always chose orange, then, at the end of a 
block, the process will reach a position of around 50 on average. If one or both subjects 
always chose purple then, at the end of a block, the process will reach a position of 
around 0 on average. However, this score fluctuates randomly, and can in principle end 
up far away from these values. At the end of each block, a red “continue” button will 
appear at the bottom of the screen. You may press the button when you are ready to move 
on to the next block. There will be two practice blocks at the start to gain familiarity with 
the process. 
 
To illustrate, see the figures below with possible paths of your earnings over time when 
you and the other subject make different color choices. Figure 1 below depicts possible 
paths of the signal process during two consecutive blocks given that both you and the 
other subject chose orange. The process starts at zero at the beginning of every block. 
The horizontal graph lines count 20 units of the process increasing or decreasing and the 
ticker line in the middle denotes the starting point of the signal. In this instance, the signal 
position exhibited a net rise of 50 units in the first block, followed by a rise of 46.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Possible path of the signal if both of you chose orange throughout 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Possible path of the signal if one or both of you chose purple throughout 
 
 
 
Figure 2 above depicts possible paths of the signal process for two consecutive blocks 
given that you chose purple and the other subject orange. In this instance, the signal 
position dropped 6 units in the first block, followed by a drop of 4 units in the next block.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 below depicts the possible path of the signal process during a single block given 
that the other subject chose orange throughout the block and you switched from orange to 
purple halfway through the block. 
 
 
Figure 3: Possible path of the signal if you switch from orange to purple after 48 periods 
 
 
 
Communication 
 
In addition to observing the signal process, you will be able to send messages to and 
receive messages from the other subject. At the beginning of every block, you will be 
able tell the other subject the percentage of time you plan to choose orange in the next 
block. You will be able to tell the other subject a plan for choosing orange some 
percentage of time if the signal position is above or below some number of your 
choosing. Once you have entered and submitted your answers, your message will be sent 
to the other subject and you will receive the other subjects’ message. You will see on the 
right-hand side of your screen both your most recent message and the other subject’s 
most recent message throughout the next block. At the end of every block you will 
observe your most recent message as well as the other subject’s most recent message 
while completing your next message for the subsequent block. You will have the option 
of submitting the same message as before or submitting a different message. Below are 
some screenshots to illustrate. 
 
 
 Figure 4: Screenshot of initial message screen at the beginning of the first block  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Screenshot of messages sent and received at the beginning of the first block 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Screenshot of a subject at the end of a block 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Screenshot of a subject at the end of a block if changing message 
 
 
Ground Rules 
Please wear the headphones provided throughout the experiment, except when instructed 
to do so by the experimenters. We also ask that you disconnect your cellphones 
throughout the duration of the experiment. 
